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This essay intends to argue for the affinity between the Gorgias and the Republic concerning 
issues of moral psychology. To this end I will divide my argument into two halves. The first 
half will show how the Calliclean moral psychology outlined at 491e-492a implies the 
possibility of conflict within the soul, especially regarding the relationship between epithumiai 
and shame. It will then argue that Socrates recognizes the appetitive element of the soul in his 
reply to Callicles but does not explore its consequences in any depth. The second half will 
contend that thumos – in the form of shame – is represented dramatically, and to some extent 
theoretically by Plato as one source of human motivation independent from reason, and 
recognized as such by the Calliclean position. My ultimate goal is to show how Plato raises 
questions in the Gorgias that hint at the theory of the tripartite soul expounded in book IV of the 
Republic, even though the answers here remain insufficient. The Gorgias therefore invites its 
readers to reflect critically on so-called Socratic intellectualism pointing to a more complex 
conception of human motivation that will be developed in the Republic. 
 
 
1- Introduction1 
 
The place of the Gorgias in the corpus Platonicum – whether it belongs to the 
group of “early or Socratic dialogues” or points to the Platonic theories developed in the 
Republic, especially regarding issues of moral psychology – has been subject to almost 
endless discussion. Scholars disagree not only on matters of chronology, however, but 
on the nature of the philosophical content presented in the dialogue. One idiosyncratic 
                                                 
This paper is result of my research on Plato's moral psychology in the Gorgias and the Republic 
conducted during my stay as Visiting Scholar at the Faculty of Classics at the University of 
Cambridge. I would like to thank Prof. Marco Zingano (Universidade de São Paulo/Brazil), and 
Prof. David Sedley (Faculty of Classics, University of Cambridge) who commented on an 
earlier version of this essay with important suggestions that have contributed considerably to my 
argument. I would also like to thank the Brazilian funding agency FAPESP (Fundação de 
Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo) for having awarded me a scholarship to study in 
England (Fapesp proc. 2011/02005-4). 
1 For the purposes of this paper, I have used Tom Griffith's translation of the Gorgias 
(Cambridge, 2010) and G.M.A Grube's translation, subsequently revised by C.D.C Reeve, of the 
Republic (Indianapolis, 1997). I have made some slight modifications to their translations in 
order to better cohere with my text, but this is not to question the original translation (e.g. 
“temperance” instead of “moderation” for sōphrosunē, “appetite” instead of “desire” for 
epithumia, and so on). 
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reading of the Gorgias is advanced by Charles Kahn in his book Plato and the Socratic 
Dialogue (Cambridge 1996) in which he argues against a developmental approach to 
Platonic philosophy and argues instead for an ingressive interpretation – which is to say, 
“to identify the meaning of a particular argument or an entire work by locating it within 
the larger thought-world articulated in the middle dialogues” (1996: 59).2 On this 
reading, Plato is supposed to have written some “Socratic” dialogues (namely, Crito, 
Ion, Lesser Hippias, and Apology) before conceiving the complete philosophical 
doctrines on metaphysics, morality, and politics expounded in the Republic. To prepare 
readers for this new philosophical insight Plato is supposed to have written the so-called 
“threshold dialogues”, which are aporetic and are devoted largely to defining the virtues 
(namely, Laches, Charmides, Euthyphro, Protagoras, Meno, Lysis, and Euthydemus). 
The Gorgias would therefore occupy an intermediate position between these two 
groups, since it is not aporetic but advances certain moral and political arguments that 
Plato will develop (often in quite different terms) in the Republic (1996: 40-41).3 
Referring to Plato’s testimony in Seven Letter (Ep. VII 324a), Kahn also indulges in 
chronological speculation, suggesting that the Gorgias was composed before the 
“threshold” dialogues, when Plato broke with Athenian politics culminating later in his 
relocation to Sicily (1996: 127).  
Regarding the philosophical meaning of the Gorgias, Kahn remarks that the 
most cogent arguments Socrates employs to undermine Callicles’ position are those that 
take the form of analogy or comparison: between virtues and the products of art or 
nature, between politics and the building trade, between politics and medicine and so 
on. Under the ingressive interpretation advanced by Kahn, Plato may have felt after 
writing the Gorgias that this analogical approach was not satisfactory and that a more 
complex explanation should be pursued. This realization may have been expressed in 
the Charmides, in which Critias criticises the argument from analogy employed by 
                                                 
2 C. Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue (Cambridge, 1996), 63: “I have shown elsewhere 
how the thematic structure of the Republic is characterized by techniques of proleptic 
composition that rise to a crescendo in Books VI-VII. I suggest that an analogous plan of 
ingressive exposition, using similar techniques, leads from dialogue to dialogue to the very 
same climax in the central books of the Republic. At this point the developmental and the 
ingressive interpretations are strictly incompatible, since on my view there is no more reason to 
speak of Plato's intellectual development between the Laches and the Republic than there is to 
speak of his development between Book I and Book X of the Republic.” 
3 On criticism of Kahn's interpretation, see J. Cooper, “Socrates and Plato in Plato’s Gorgias” 
(Princeton, 1999), 30. 
Journal of Ancient Philosophy 
ISSN 1981-9471 - FFLCH/USP 
www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga
J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.11, n.1. p. 20-65, 2017. 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v11i1p20-65 
21
  
Socrates (Chrm. 165e, 166b). Kahn asserts that the Republic is in some sense a re-
elaboration of the arguments employed in the Gorgias, but in a more satisfactory way, 
grounded in psychological, epistemological, and metaphysical theories that support the 
assumptions Socrates weakly attempted to defend in the Gorgias (1996: 144). Kahn 
sums up the philosophical contribution made by the Gorgias to the later dialogues as 
follows: “The Gorgias implies that this harmony between life and belief holds because 
Socrates’ doctrines are, and his adversaries’ claims are not, in agreement with their own 
boulesthai, their rational desire for the good. This connection between the personal 
dimension of the elenchus and Plato’s theory of desire is perhaps the most fundamental 
insight of the dialogue" (1996: 145). 
Nevertheless, this separation proposed by Kahn between the Gorgias and the 
Republic both in philosophical and in chronological matters has been challenged by 
other scholars, such as Terence Irwin and John Cooper. Irwin identifies a tension in the 
Gorgias regarding issues of moral psychology. The so-called Socratic intellectualism 
advanced by Socrates in the first half of the dialogue during the discussion with Gorgias 
and Polus is apparently contradicted by the examination of temperance and 
intemperance during the discussion with Callicles in the second half, which to some 
extent anticipates the arguments made in the Republic. According to Irwin, the 
recognition of the epithumiai as good-independent desires in the soul – and 
consequently the possibility of inner conflict between different motivational sources, 
even though not made explicit by Plato – is not consistent with his earlier assumptions 
on moral psychology in the Gorgias (e.g. 467c ff.).4 Irwin admits that “Socrates’ 
previous argument against the value of rhetoric assumes the truth of the Socratic 
Paradox. The defence of temperance and continence assumes the falsity of the Paradox. 
The conclusions of these two main lines of argument in the dialogue are never 
satisfactorily reconciled” (1979: 218; my italics). Irwin seems to reiterate this argument 
in his commentary on the Gorgias in his book Plato’s Ethics (Oxford, 1995), in which 
he affirms that “[Socrates’] claims about self-control and the non-rational part of the 
soul give us some reason for supposing that he has doubts about the eudaemonist 
rejection of incontinence”, such that “the Gorgias sometimes rejects psychological 
eudaemonism” and seems “internally inconsistent on this major issue” (1995: 116). This 
                                                 
4 T. Irwin, Plato. Gorgias (Oxford, 1979), at 191; Plato's Ethics (Oxford, 1995), at 116. 
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is basically the same position restated in his monumental The Development of Ethics – 
Volume I published some years ago (Oxford 2007: 75). 
In contrast to Kahn, Irwin considers that the treatment of the epithumiai by 
Socrates in his discussion of temperance and intemperance with Callicles provides the 
reader with arguments which cast at least some doubt on the value of “Socratic 
intellectualism” and highlights various issues of moral psychology that Plato will 
develop more completely in the Republic. While Kahn views the Gorgias as far 
removed from the Republic (although recognizing some notable similarities), Irwin 
argues for a closer relationship between the two dialogues on issues of moral 
psychology. Irwin, however, considers the tension between Socratic intellectualism and 
the Platonic advancements in this field of philosophical inquiry to be irreconcilable, and 
admits the inconsistency of Plato’s own position in the Gorgias which will only be 
resolved in the Republic. In sum, Irwin seems to regard the Gorgias as a kind of 
transitional dialogue in which Plato presents some criticism to Socratic intellectualism 
and begins to develop a more complex moral psychology according to which 
nonrational elements within the soul are considered motivational sources alongside 
reasoned deliberation.  
John Cooper, in turn, would broadly agree with Irwin against Kahn’s reading but 
disagrees with him in several ways, especially regarding the apparent inconsistency of 
Socrates’ position in the Gorgias. In his essay “Socrates and Plato in Plato’s Gorgias” 
(Princeton 1999), Cooper adopts a methodological principle that is alien to readings 
such as Irwin’s: Plato conveys the philosophical content of the dialogues not only by 
means of his protagonist Socrates, but through other interlocutors (1999: 31). This 
enables him to reinterpret the apparent inconsistency of the Gorgias discussed by Irwin, 
by distinguishing between the real position of Socrates’ character throughout the 
dialogue and that of Callicles (indeed, Cooper emphasizes this third section of the 
dialogue in his analysis). According to Cooper, the Gorgias points out the weakness of 
the Socratic view of human psychology not through Socrates’ contradictory 
assumptions in the dialogue – as argued by Irwin – but through an alternative moral 
psychology outlined by Callicles at 491e-492c. Cooper argues that “Callicles 
conspicuously employs ideas about the virtues (for example, bravery) and about the 
psychology of human action which depart from those Socrates himself relies on in other 
Socratic dialogues and indeed earlier in this one. Furthermore, these ideas line up vey 
closely with the quite different ideas of these matters espoused by the Socrates of the 
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Republic. […] We have every reason to believe that in writing the Republic, Plato 
believed the new moral psychology presented there, and the new theory of the moral 
virtues based upon it, to be philosophically more defensible than the ‛Socratic’ one” 
(1999: 32). Cooper therefore argues that Socrates notices these innovations advanced by 
Callicles throughout the discussion of temperance and intemperance, despite apparently 
disregarding them in his response. Arguing against Irwin’s interpretation, he seeks to 
demonstrate that Socrates is aware of the implications of Callicles’ moral psychology, 
but by choosing not to address them directly he avoids adopting a position that would 
contradict his intellectualist stance in his previous discussions with Polus and Gorgias 
(1999: 59). In other words, Cooper tries to recover the integrity of Socrates’ position in 
the Gorgias by ascribing the innovations in issues of moral psychology highlighted by 
Irwin not to Socrates, but to Callicles. 
On the other hand, in her essay “Calculating Machines or Leaky Jars? The Moral 
Psychology of Plato’s Gorgias” (Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 26, 2004) 
Gabriela Carone challenges the general view shared both by Irwin and Cooper – 
namely, that the Gorgias constitutes a sort of transitional dialogue that points towards 
the moral psychology of the Republic. She considers that the problem identified by both 
scholars concerning the tension between the intellectualist approach advanced by 
Socrates in the first half of the dialogue and the “irrationalist” one encountered in the 
second half of the Gorgias is to misconstrue both “Socratic intellectualism” and the 
“irrationalist” strand. Carone therefore attempts to argue that “the Socratic 
intellectualism expounded in the dialogue does not preclude, but rather presupposes, a 
strong emotional component as a decisive factor in the explanation of human 
motivation. Likewise, the apparent soul division proposed in the discussion with 
Callicles later on in the dialogue need not – pace Cooper, Irwin, and others – treat desire 
or epithumia as a distinct source of motivation that could have a strength independent of 
the strength of reason” (2004: 59). The crucial point advanced by Carone lies in her 
interpretation of the recognition that appetites constitute but one element of the soul. 
According to her, there is nothing in the Gorgias that allows us to infer that the 
epithumiai are an independent source of human motivation that might conflict with 
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reason; the recognition of the appetites as being but one factor of human personality 
does not in itself imply the rejection of Socratic intellectualism (2004: 59).5 
Carone’s approach to the Gorgias, especially concerning the way she 
understands the Socratic “intellectualism”, is akin to some extent to the insightful 
reading of Socrates’ philosophy advanced by Brickhouse and Smith since their Plato’s 
Socrates (Oxford 1994) – nonetheless, I will focus here for the sake of objectivity on 
their last comprehensive book on this topic (Socratic Moral Psychology, Cambridge 
2010). In their alternative way of understanding the Socratic “intellectualism”, 
Brickhouse & Smith contend that Socrates acknowledges the existence of nonrational 
desires within the soul – such as pleasures, pains, appetites, anger, love and fears6 – but 
they do not constitute a source of motivation independently of the desire of the good 
(2010: 143-144). Nonetheless, instead of providing only information to reason as 
defended by the standard view of the Socratic intellectualism according to them, 
appetites and passions are deemed as affecting cognition and influencing judgement “by 
the way in which they represent their aims to the soul” (2010: 52). In this sense, 
appetites and passions still have a explanatory or causal role in the Socratic moral 
psychology (2010: 132), even though ultimately it is always the rational desire – i.e. the 
desire aroused by what we believe best for us to do at the time of action – that motivates 
us and leads us to act. In other words, “actions always follows belief” (2010: 107), but 
this belief about what is best for us to do can be brought about by strong influence of 
nonrational affections, specially in the cases of people whose appetites and passions 
became unrestrained due to a bad education. Thus, concerning the Gorgias, and 
specifically the discussion about temperance and intemperance in Callicles’ section 
(2010: 51), Brickhouse and Smith contend that there is nothing “new” or “un-Socratic” 
there, insofar as the acknowledgement of the epithumiai as one element within the soul 
                                                 
5 It is worth noting that Carone understands Socratic intellectualism in a different way from that 
generally understood. According to her, it presupposes not only rational belief but recognises 
affections and emotions as a decisive factor in the explanation of human motivation (2004: 56). 
However, the relationship between the rational and the nonrational is regarded by her as co-
instantiated, such that removing the affect implies effectively removing the belief, and vice-
versa (2004: 92). Consequently altering their set of beliefs would be sufficient to persuade an 
interlocutor of the truth of Socratic moral opinions, provided this is done with appropriate logoi. 
In this sense, her interpretation remains essentially “intellectualist”. 
6 Some texts used by Brickhouse and Smith to support their reading: pleasures, pains, appetites, 
and fears (Lach. 191e4-7); the distinction between boulesis, epithumia and erōs (Chrm. 167e1-
5); different kinds of desire (Lys. 220e6-221b8); anger, fear, and shame (Ap. 21b1-23e3; 29e3-
30a3; 32b1-d4). 
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is absolutely compatible with their alternative approach to the Socratic moral 
psychology in the early Platonic dialogues (pace Irwin and others). Although Carone in 
the essay referred above agrees with them on this revaluation of the Socratic 
intellectualism against the standard view that seeks to deny, broadly speaking, any role 
to nonrational affections in the Socratic theory of action7, she does not accept, as we 
will see later on, the causal or explanatory role ascribed by them to appetites and 
passions; for her, it is rather logoi that act upon them, and not the other way round 
(2004: 89-90). 
These conflicting approaches to the Gorgias reveal how the issues of moral 
psychology therein remain controversial and liable to different interpretations, 
especially concerning its relationship with the Republic in this field of philosophical 
inquiry. In this essay, I will attempt to further this debate by analysing not only the 
treatment of the epithumiai in the Gorgias, and its meaning, but also the role of shame 
in the dialogue in order to understand to what extent we can understand such moral 
feeling as a manifestation of the thumos. I shall state here, then, my broad sympathy for 
Cooper’s reading of the Gorgias – particularly regarding his interpretation of the 
alternative moral psychology supported by Callicles (491e-492c) – and my scepticism 
of Carone’s criticism of his interpretation (I will resume this defence of Cooper’s 
reading later on). Consequently, I will attempt to show that even though Brickhouse and 
Smith’s alternative approach is very insightful and consistent when applied to the early 
dialogues, in the case of the Gorgias, however, their arguments advanced in the book 
Socratic Moral Psychology do not outweigh the evidence that points towards further 
developments in the Platonic moral psychology we find in books IV, VIII and IX of the 
Republic – particuarly concerning the notion of temperance as a kind of orderliness 
(503d-505c; 506d-507a), and the reflexions on happiness and virtue expressed by 
Callicles at 491e-492c, which Brickhouse and Smith does not explore appropriately8. 
                                                 
7 The standard view is accordingly represented, for Brickhouse and Smith, by Terry Penner's 
interpretation (“Socrates and the early dialogues”. In R. Kraut (ed.). The Cambridge Companion 
to Plato. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, at 128-129), whose main tenets would 
be the following: (i) there are no desires other than rational desires; (ii) a rational desire is one 
that always adjusts to the agent's beliefs about what is best for him or her; and (iii) the only way 
to alter intentional action is to alter the agent's belief about what is best for him or her (2010: 
50-51). 
8 My disagreement with them regarding the Gorgias is above all methodological: since they 
focus on the Socratic moral psychology, they disregard relevant philosophical content conveyed 
by characters other than Socrates, such as Callicles. Thus, if there is important advancement in 
the discussion on moral psychology issues expressed by Callicles, as Cooper contends, to deem 
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Ultimately, I think that the traditional view of the Gorgias as a transitional dialogue 
continues to be the most plausible reading. 
 Thus, to make clear what is meant by “Socratic intellectualism”, let us first 
summarize the assumptions that underpin this moral view of human motivation that we 
find scattered throughout the Platonic dialogues (cf. e.g. Prt. 358b-d; Meno 77b-78b; 
Euthd. 281b; R. I 351a; Grg. 460b, 467c-468c, 509e): 
(a) knowledge of the good is sufficient for a virtuous action (Grg. 460b); and/or, in a 
broader scope, no one acts against what she thinks for her to be the best course of 
action, if it is in her power to do so (the prudential paradox) (Prt. 358b-d); 
(b) no one does wrong willingly (the moral paradox) (Prt. 345d-e; Grg. 509e); 
(c) everybody wishes the good, and it is for the sake of the good that one does 
everything he does (Grg. 468b-c); 
(d) ergo, when one does wrong she does so unwillingly because she mistakenly 
supposes that her action will somehow benefit her, though it in fact harms her. If she 
understood the reasons why a given course of action is harmful, she would act 
accordingly; 
(e) ergo, the moral phenomenon known as “weakness of will” (akrasia), as the majority  
understand it (Prt. 352d) – that is to say, whenever one does something motivated by 
nonrational forces within his soul (such as anger, pleasure, pain, sexual desire, and fear), 
even though understanding that she should not do so and it being possible for her to 
pursue the opposite course of action – is the result of nothing but ignorance.  
 After that, we can proceed to the analysis of relevant passages of the Gorgias on 
moral psychology issues in order to evaluate the pros and cons of the different 
interpretations mentioned above. 
 
2 – Epithumiai and Thumos in the Gorgias 
 
 One of the most prominent features of the Socratic elenchus in dialogues like the 
Gorgias is its ad hominem aspect:9 scrutiny of the opinions advanced by the interlocutor 
                                                                                                                                               
to what extent the Gorgias is related to the Republic in this field of philosophical inquiry 
requires rather a comprehensive approach to the dialogue that deals with both Socrates' and 
Callicles' views Nonetheless, I would like to state that Brickhouse and Smith's interpretation of 
the Socratic intellectualism in the early dialogues is quite convincing in several points; what I 
will criticize here is specifically how they use the Gorgias as evidence for their alternative 
approach. Besides disregarding the so-called Calliclean moral psychology (491e-492c) that 
presents common features to the Platonic theory developed in the Republic, I think that they do 
not tackle the physiology of the appetites in the orderliness argument (503d-505c; 506d-507a) 
in a sufficient manner, as we shall see. 
9 On the ad hominem feature of the Socratic elenchus, see Kahn 1996, 133-137; F. Gonzalez, 
“Introduction: A Short History of Platonic Interpretation and the ‘Third Way’” (Lanham, 1995), 
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implies the examination of the condition of his soul through consideration of his life and 
mode of living.10 In Callicles’ case, this is accomplished through the vivid way Plato 
depicts his character – maybe the most emblematic of Socrates’ interlocutors in the 
corpus Platonicum – and by the methods Socrates employs to refute him. When taking 
the role of Socrates’ main interlocutor, Callicles makes a long speech that can be 
divided in three parts (482c-486d): (i) a reflection on the refutation of Polus and 
Gorgias, rebuking them, on one hand, for being overcome by shame and giving 
themselves to contradiction, and accusing Socrates, on the other hand, of eristic play 
throughout the discussion (482c4-483a7); (ii) an exposition of his conception of human 
political nature designated by the notion of “the law of nature” or “the just by nature” 
(483a7-484c3); and (iii) an invective against philosophy and the philosopher (484c4-
486d1). Callicles is portrayed by Plato as an interlocutor who is confident of his own 
opinions, supporting them arduously and resisting Socrates’ attempts to persuade him of 
the superiority of the philosophical life over the political. Socrates tells him – ironically, 
as later becomes clear – that he has three essential qualities that enable him to verify his 
own moral convictions – namely, knowledge, benevolence, and frankness (ἐπιστήμην τε 
καὶ εὔνοιαν καὶ παρρησίαν, 487a2-3). The presence of these three qualities will be 
verified by Socrates through elenchus and the concurrent examination of Callicles’ soul. 
 In Callicles’ case the Socratic elenchus has a threefold role corresponding to 
each of these three personal qualities: (i) to reveal the interlocutor’s ignorance by 
leading him to contradict himself on issues of paramount importance, such as virtue and 
happiness; (ii) to reveal the absence of eunoia and philia between them;11 and (iii) to 
test Callicles’ frankness in order to verify to what extent he is immune to shame, in 
contrast to Gorgias and Polus. One may assume that this examination is the ultimate 
goal of the arguments employed by Socrates when confronting Callicles, given the ad 
                                                                                                                                               
at 11; C. Kahn, “Drama and Dialectic in Plato’s Gorgias”, Oxford Studies in Ancient 
Philosophy, 1 (1983), at 75; E. Rutherford, The Art of Plato (London, 1995), at 146-7. 
10 Cf. Prt. 333b7-9. 
11 The several ironic references to philia by Socrates (482a5, 487e5, 499c3-4, 491d4, 497d5, 
500b6, 507a3, 508a3, 519d5, 519e3) demonstrate precisely this feature of the discussion 
between them. In this regard the absence of friendship indicates in advance the failure of the 
discussion, since philia is one of the conditions for philosophical dialogue. As Malcolm 
Schofield notes: “If rhetoric and philosophy present incommensurable modes of thought and 
discourse, how can the common search for truth which Socratic conversation undertakes have 
any hope of success with interlocutors not committed to its methods and objects?” 
(“Approaching the Republic”, in C. Rowe and M. Schofield (eds.), The Cambridge History of 
Greek and Roman Political Thought (Cambridge, 2000), at 194). 
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hominem nature of the elenchus. In his examination of Callicles’ political convictions, 
the tension between their respective moral opinions becomes more salient. While for 
Socrates the virtuous person is “temperate, his own master, ruling the pleasures and 
appetites within himself” (σώφρονα ὄντα καὶ ἐγκρατῆ αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ, τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ 
ἐπιθυμιῶν ἄρχοντα τῶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ, 491d11-e1), for Callicles virtue and happiness consist 
in “luxury, intemperance and freedom” (τρυφὴ καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ ἐλευθερία, 492c4-5). 
In this context of the dialogue, Callicles articulates a moral psychology on which is 
grounded his political ideal, as espoused in his main speech. Accordingly, the person 
who intends to be happy must allow his own appetites to be as great as possible and 
must be able to satisfy them whenever they arise, having sufficiently bravery and 
intelligence to restrain whatever pathos might disturb this process, such as fear or 
shame (491e-492b). In Callicles’ view, the praise of temperance (sōphrosunē) and 
justice (dikaiosunē) – that is to say, the conventional justice established by laws and 
customs shared by the majority – is ascribed only to those who are unable to satisfy 
their appetites and who would otherwise be slaves of the better and superior people by 
nature. 
 The hedonistic conception of happiness defended by Callicles implies, therefore, 
the capacity to fulfil one’s appetites and, consequently, to provide pleasure for oneself. 
Socrates, on the other hand, refers to a Sicilian or Italian myth (492e-494a) in order to 
show Callicles that the intemperate person – likened to a leaky jar concerning the “part” 
of the soul where the appetites are – is unable to satisfy them completely. Inasmuch as 
he is unable to satisfy them, he suffers great pains instead of experiencing pleasure 
continuously. As such, the intemperate person is the most unhappy. The temperate and 
ordered one, conversely, is able to fulfil his appetites moderately and by succeeding in 
doing so remains calm and comfortable. Socrates thus responds that it is not the 
intemperate but the temperate person who lives well and is happier, insofar as he is able 
to satisfy his appetites moderately as discussed later on (503c-d). The disagreement 
between Callicles and Socrates concerns not only the moral value assigned to 
temperance and intemperance in view of human happiness, but also the physiology of 
pleasure. While Socrates seems to assume that the process of fulfilling the appetites 
consists in a blend of pleasure and pain, such that there is no experience of pure 
pleasure at all in repletive appetites such as hunger and thirst (496b-497a), Callicles 
regards pleasure as an experience concurrent with the process of satisfying them, such 
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that the more one maximizes her appetites, the more pleasure she will have in fulfilling 
them; when one is satiated, in turn, she no longer feels pain or pleasure (494a-b). 
 
2.1 – Epithumiai 
 
My intention, however, is not to judge which physiology of pleasure is better 
reasoned in the dialogue, or whether the argument subsequently advanced by Socrates 
in order to demonstrate the distinction between goodness and pleasure is logically 
valid.12 Instead, my intention is to show that the discussion of temperance and 
intemperance between Socrates and Callicles contains features that evoke the treatment 
of the “part” of the soul in books IV, VIII and IX of the Republic, especially regarding 
to epithumētikon. These features may be classified as follows: (a) lexical similarity; (b) 
methodological similarities in the examination of the epithumiai; (c) paradigmatic 
examples of epithumiai; and (d) the function of punishment for the intemperate person 
in accordance with the analogy between soul and body. Let us analyse each in turn. 
(a) The most straightforward similarity between the Gorgias and the Republic 
regarding  the treatment of the epithumiai is linguistic. In the myth which Socrates 
employs to persuade Callicles of the superiority of temperance over intemperance, there 
are three verbal formulations (τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο ἐν ᾧ ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσὶ, 493a3; τοῦτο τῆς 
ψυχῆς οὗ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσί, 493b1; τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον ... ψυχῆς, 496e7) that are quite 
similar to those ones employed by Plato in book IV of the Republic to designate the 
‘parts’ of soul (τι ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, IV 431a4; οὐκ ἐνεῖναι μὲν ἐν τῇ 
ψυχῇ αὐτῶν τὸ κελεῦον, ἐνεῖναι δὲ τὸ κωλῦον πιεῖν, ἄλλο ὂν καὶ κρατοῦν τοῦ 
κελεύοντος; IV 439c5-7). As G. R. F. Ferrari points out, when Plato does not use 
technical terminology for the “parts” of the soul – namely to logistikon, to thumoeides, 
to epithumētikon – the most common term he employs is eidē or its semantic equivalent 
genē. The precise term that designates “part” in Greek – meros – appears only seven 
times in book IV.13 While the linguistic argument alone is not enough to demonstrate a 
conceptual affinity between the Gorgias and the Republic concerning issues of moral 
                                                 
12 Especially when he makes the interlocutor concede that pleasure and pain coexist in the 
process of fulfilling one’s appetites, while goodness and badness are never concurrent (495c3-
497a5). On criticism of Socrates' arguments, see J. Beversluis, Cross-Examining Socrates 
(Cambridge 2000), 355-356; Irwin 1979: 201-202. 
13 G. R. F. Ferrari, “The Three-Part Soul”, in G. R. F. Ferrari (ed.) The Cambridge Companion 
to Plato's Republic (Cambridge 2007), at 165 n. 1. 
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psychology,14 it seems undeniable that in this earlier dialogue we can at least find the 
acknowledgement of the epithumiai as an important aspect of the psychological domain, 
whose corresponding virtue is temperance. The task immediately faced by the reader is 
to evaluate to what extent Plato considers the appetites in the Gorgias as one source of 
human motivation either in accordance with or in contrast with the rational 
deliberations. In other words, the problem consists in verifying whether reason alone is 
sufficient and necessary condition for determining what we desire or the appetites 
constitute another source of human motivation independent from reason such that their 
different strengths might conflict. 
(b) Within the context of Platonic moral psychology, the Gorgias presents as 
intrinsic the ideas of “order” and “temperance” (493c-d; 494a; 503e-504d; 506e-507a; 
507e-508a). The notion of “order” ascribed to the temperate soul implies a hierarchical 
relationship between its elements. This is especially evident in the analogy drawn by 
Socrates between art and virtue, in which he compares the order and arrangement 
instilled in the objects produced by craftsmen with the orderliness of the virtuous soul: 
SOC: […] Take painters, if you like, or builders, or shipwrights, or any of the other skilled 
practitioners – whichever of them you like. Each one positions each thing he positions in some 
structure, and compels one thing to be appropriate and harmonise [ἁρμόττειν] with another, 
until he has composed the whole into a thing of order and system [τεταγμένον τε καὶ 
κεκοσμημένον πρᾶγμα]. (503e4-504a1; my italics) 
The analogy implies that just as craftsmen instil a certain orderliness in their 
products by which they are useful, so there is a similar condition concerning the soul – 
namely, justice and temperance (δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ σωφροσύνη, 504d3).15 At the 
                                                 
14 According to Irwin, it is not possible to determine from these formulations whether in the 
Gorgias Plato means 'parts' or, more broadly, 'aspects' of the soul (1979, 195). But he does not 
explain in which would consist the distinction between 'parts' and 'aspects' and what 
consequences each would have for our understanding of the Gorgias. Louis-André Dorion, 
conversely, argues that the expression employed by Plato has a markedly 'local' character, such 
that it suggests more a part of the soul than an aspect of it ('Enkrateia and the Partition of the 
Soul in the Gorgias', in R. Barney et alli (eds.), Plato and Divided Soul (Cambridge, 2012), at 
41).  
15 Carone sums up the question thus: “Interpretations of this Gorgias passage have ranged from 
attributing to it a partite view of the psyche (so that the thing to be structured appropriately is, at 
least partly, one's desire or epithumia) to viewing it as no more than consistency among one's 
beliefs. The former view seems supported by the fact that the description is inserted in the 
context of a discussion of what desires should or should not be given satisfaction (503c-d, 504e-
505b); the latter, by Socrates' apparent introduction of the issue of order as way of illustrating 
how the good man will nor speak (legein) at random but with some good aim (503d-e), which 
was said to be make the citizen better through speeches (502e)” (2004: 80-81). 
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beginning of the discussion on temperance and intemperance, when Socrates leads the 
argument from the political domain to the psychological, the question he poses to 
Callicles is whether the better and more powerful person “rules himself” (αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ 
ἄρχειν, 491d8) or whether it is enough to rule everyone else. Even though Socrates does 
not explore completely the notion of “self-mastery” in the Gorgias, it seems implicit 
that if something rules, another must be ruled.16 The most plausible inference is that 
what rules is the rational element of the soul – although this is not made explicit by 
Socrates – while what is to be ruled are the appetites and pleasures.17  
When we turn to the analysis of temperance in book IV of the Republic, the 
allusions to the arguments presented in the Gorgias in the examination of the epithumiai 
seem to be straightforward. In accordance with the methodological principle of the 
Republic – the analogy between city and individual – if the city is composed of three 
classes (χρηματιστικόν, ἐπικουρητικόν, βουλευτικόν, IV 441a1), then the soul has three 
“parts” as well: that by which we learn, that by which we anger and that by which we 
have appetites (μανθάνομεν μὲν ἑτέρῳ, θυμούμεθα δὲ ἄλλῳ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, ἐπιθυμοῦμεν 
δ’ αὖ τρίτῳ τινὶ, IV 436a9-b1). The notion of temperance is discussed from two 
different standpoints, the political and the psychological (430d-432b and 441c-444a 
respectively). When dealing with temperance in the city, Socrates compares it to a kind 
of “harmony and symphony” between the three classes that compose the whole 
(συμφωνίᾳ τινὶ καὶ ἁρμονίᾳ προσέοικεν μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ πρότερον, IV 430e1-2; cf. IV 
431e7-432b1), and defines it as “a kind of order, the mastery of certain kinds of 
pleasures and appetites” (Κόσμος πού τις, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐστὶν καὶ ἡδονῶν 
τινων καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐγκράτεια, IV 430e4-5), which the majority call “self-control” (ὥς 
φασι κρείττω δὴ αὑτοῦ, IV 430e5-6). 
If we compare the passage of the Gorgias in which the notion of “ruling 
himself” is presented (αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχειν, 491d8) with that of the Republic in which 
                                                 
16 Cooper 1999: 65-66. 
17 Dorion 2012, 42-3: “Ultimately, the reflexive form of expressions ʽto govern oneselfʼ and ʽto 
master oneselfʼ entail that such control is exercised within the self – that is, the soul. 
responsibility for such control lies necessarily with another part of the soul, which can only be 
the logos or reason. Although in the Gorgias Plato never explicitly asserts a bipartition of the 
soul into reason and desire, one can conclude nonetheless (in the light of 491d and 493a-b) that 
Plato envisages a bipartition of this sort. But if reason must assume responsibility for self-
government and mastery of the pleasures, it seems impossible to attribute this responsibility to 
enkrateia. Here too the Gorgias is in agreement with the Republic: to the extent that reason 
affects self-mastery, enkrateia, conceived as an ability to master the desires and the appeal of 
the pleasures, appears functionless.” 
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the notion of “self-control” (ὥς φασι κρείττω δὴ αὑτοῦ, IV 430e5-6) is explored by 
Socrates, the lexical and conceptual similarity is clear:18 
(i) Grg. 491d10-e1:  
SOC: Nothing complicated. I mean what most people mean, being temperate, his own master, 
ruling the pleasures and appetites within himself. 
{ΣΩ.} Οὐδὲν ποικίλον ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, σώφρονα ὄντα καὶ ἐγκρατῆ αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ, τῶν 
ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἄρχοντα τῶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ.  
 
(ii) R. IV 430e4-7: 
─ Temperance is surely a kind of order, the mastery of certain kinds of pleasures and appetites. 
People indicate as much when they use the phrase “self-control” and other similar phrases. I 
don’t know just what they mean by them, but they are, so to speak, like tracks or clues that 
temperance has left behind in language. Isn’t that so?  
Κόσμος πού τις, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐστὶν καὶ ἡδονῶν τινων καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐγκράτεια, ὥς 
φασι κρείττω δὴ αὑτοῦ ἀποφαίνοντες οὐκ οἶδ’ ὅντινα τρόπον, καὶ ἄλλα ἄττα τοιαῦτα ὥσπερ 
ἴχνη αὐτῆς λέγεται. ἦ γάρ;  
 How can we interpret this sort of inter-textuality? Is it merely a coincidence 
inasmuch as Plato refers to a popular topic on ethics, as he points out (Grg. 491d10: 
ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί; R. IV 430e5: ὥς φασι)? Or is Plato consciously stating in the Republic 
that he is returning to issues that have not been satisfactorily treated in earlier 
dialogues? If so, is it reasonable to suggest that this kind of literary device represents a 
reminiscent allusion to the previous discussion of the same topic in the Gorgias, if we 
assume that the Gorgias precedes the Republic as generally agreed?19 I believe that the 
explanation offered by Socrates in book IV – namely, that the notion of “self-mastery” 
only makes sense if there are by nature better and worse elements within the soul of a 
single person (ὥς τι ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ μὲν βέλτιον ἔνι, τὸ δὲ 
χεῖρον, IV 431a4-5) – responds explicitly to what the Gorgias did not provide a 
straightforward answer to. In other words, what we could previously only infer from the 
Gorgias regarding temperance and intemperance is made explicit by Socrates in the 
Republic – that what must rule is reason and what must be ruled are the appetites in 
order to be a temperate person (IV 431a-e).20 Consequently, “self-mastery” denotes an 
                                                 
18 I am relying on the same point highlighted by Dorion (2012: 42). 
19 I will be considering as a reminiscent allusion any instance in which there is some 
straightforward reference in the Republic that points to the Gorgias, and as a proleptic reference 
the reverse case in which the Gorgias points to a specific passage of the Republic. I am 
therefore assuming, as the majority of scholars agree, the precedence of the Gorgias with 
respect to the Republic. On the notion of proleptic reference, see Kahn 1996: 48. 
20 More precisely, “[...] the appetites that are simple, measured, and directed by calculation in 
accordance with understanding and correct belief […] (Τὰς δέ γε ἁπλᾶς τε καὶ μετρίας, αἳ δὴ 
μετὰ νοῦ τε καὶ δόξης ὀρθῆς λογισμῷ ἄγονται, R. IV 431c5-6; my italics). 
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arrangement in which reason prevail over the appetites, with “self-defeated” denoting 
the opposite.21 
 Furthermore, when Plato examines temperance and justice in the psychological 
domain in book IV, one can identify the same association presented in the Gorgias 
between the ideas of temperance, harmony and orderliness. In the Gorgias this is 
suggested by the analogy between the products made by craftsmen and the condition of 
the temperate and just soul. In other words, the healthy soul attainable through virtue is 
comparable to the realisation of the healthy body (503d-505c). Nevertheless, although 
Socrates says that the craftsman “compels one thing to be appropriate and harmonise 
with another, until he has composed the whole into a thing of order and system” (καὶ 
προσαναγκάζει τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ πρέπον τε εἶναι καὶ ἁρμόττειν, ἕως ἂν τὸν ἅπαν 
συστήσηται τεταγμένον τε καὶ κεκοσμημένον πρᾶγμα, 503e7-504a1), he does not 
explain in any depth what occurs within the soul regarding the “parts” that compose the 
whole.22 The analogy is therefore not fully explored by Socrates in the Gorgias. He 
instead chooses to emphasize the comparison between the healthy state of the body and 
the virtuous condition of the soul – in the form of temperance and justice (504d3) – in 
order to show Callicles that only the temperate soul is able to satisfy its appetites in a 
moderate manner.23  
 However, what appears as underdeveloped in the Gorgias is developed more 
conspicuously through the new insights on moral psychology that Plato presents in book 
IV of the Republic. When examining the role of justice as dunamis (IV 443b) in 
providing unity between the three parts of soul such that each of its elements performs 
its own function, the same association between the notions of temperance, harmony and 
                                                 
21 Dorion, 2012: 42. 
22 Raphael Woolf contends that Callicles' psychic disharmony in the Gorgias manifests only in 
the inconsistency of his ethical and political opinions, as unveiled by Socratic elenchus 
(“Callicles and Socrates: Psychic (Dis)harmony in the Gorgias”, Oxford Studies in Ancient 
Philosophy, 18 (2000), at 1 and 30-32). However, insofar as the idea of orderliness and harmony 
is intrinsically associated with the temperate soul (506e-507a), it seems rather that Plato is 
conceiving them here in terms of moderation in the appetites which are deemed as a inner 
element of the soul (493a-b). The intemperate soul, conversely, would be disordered and 
disharmonic precisely because of their unrestrained appetites. 
23 This point is especially clear from the following passage: “Well, if true excellence is what you 
said it was earlier, Callicles – namely satisfying desires, both one's own and other people's – 
then yes, they were good men. If it's not that, if it's what we were compelled to agree on later in 
the argument – that we should satisfy those desires whose fulfilment makes a person better, and 
not satisfy those which make him worse, and this, we thought, was a science – are you able to 
say that any of them was a man of that kind?” (503c4-d3; my italics) 
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orderliness found in the Gorgias reappears from the standpoint of the tripartite soul. 
The following passage makes the point clear: 
[…] One who is just does not allow any part of himself to do the work of another part or allow 
the various classes within him to meddle with each other. He regulates well what is really his 
own and rules himself. He puts himself in order [κοσμήσαντα], is his own friend, and 
harmonizes [συναρμόσαντα] the three parts of himself like three limiting notes in a musical 
scale – high, low, and middle. He binds together those parts and any others there may be in 
between, and from having been many things he becomes entirely one, moderate and 
harmonious [σώφρονα καὶ ἡρμοσμένον]. […] (IV 443d2-e2; my italics) 
 (c) Although less cogent than the previous evidence we have discussed, a further 
similarity between the examinations of the epithumiai undertaken in the Gorgias and 
the Republic are the paradigmatic examples selected by Plato to analyse its physiology – 
namely, hunger and thirst. In the Gorgias, Socrates refers to these appetites in order to 
show Callicles that pleasure and goodness are different things: while goodness and 
badness never coexist, pain and pleasure are concurrent during the process of fulfilling 
these appetites (495c-497a). In the Republic, hunger and thirst are used to delimitate the 
proper domain of the epithumiai (R. IV 437b6, 437d1-3, 439d6-8; IX 580e2-5). 
 (d) In the Republic, after examining the concept of justice in the psychological 
domain, Socrates turns to analyse the consequences of his argument for injustice (R. IV 
444c-445b). To this end he refers again to the analogy between soul and body, 
according to which virtue for the soul corresponds to health for the body, and vice to 
disease (Ἀρετὴ μὲν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὑγίειά τέ τις ἂν εἴη καὶ κάλλος καὶ εὐεξία ψυχῆς, 
κακία δὲ νόσος τε καὶ αἶσχος καὶ ἀσθένεια, IV 444d12-e1). Later on Socrates suggests 
that they should investigate whether it is more advantageous to act justly and be just or 
to act unjustly and be unjust, “provided that one doesn’t pay the penalty and become 
better as a result of punishment” (ἐάνπερ μὴ διδῷ δίκην μηδὲ βελτίων γίγνηται 
κολαζόμενος, IV 445a3-4). Glaucon replies to Socrates that such an investigation would 
be ridiculous in view of the conclusions reached in the discussion about justice. But in 
what sense and to what extent would punishment rehabilitate the individual who has 
done wrong? At least in this specific passage of the Republic one cannot find a 
straightforward answer to this question. 
 The analogy between soul and body applied to the examination of virtue and 
vice is also prominent in the Gorgias (e.g. 476a-480b, 503d-505c, 512a-b), especially 
when Socrates attempts to show Polus that the greatest evil for the soul is acting 
unjustly and escaping punishment, and the second worst evil, acting unjustly (479c-d). 
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Here Socrates contends that punishing one who has done wrong has the power to 
benefit and improve his soul (βελτίων τὴν ψυχὴν γίγνεται, εἴπερ δικαίως κολάζεται, 
477a5-6). Drawing another analogy between justice and medicine, he argues that just as 
medical treatment, though painful, is capable of curing the body’s diseases, punishment, 
though painful, can heal the soul’s disease – namely injustice (and intemperance and 
vice as a whole):24 
SOC: Next question: of two people who have an evil either in their body or their soul, which is 
more wretched – the one who receives treatment and gets rid of the evil, or the one who does 
not receive treatment, and still has the evil? 
POL: The one who does not receive treatment, as it seems to me. 
SOC: Well, did paying for one’s crimes turn out to be a release from the greatest evil – badness? 
POL: Yes, it did. 
SOC: Yes, because just punishment teaches people self-control, and makes them more just. It is 
medicine for badness. 
POL: Yes. (478d1-7) 
 Therefore, the corrective function of punishment relies on the analogy between 
soul and body, between justice and medicine, between virtue and health, in accordance 
with the division of those arts related to the body and those related to the soul presented 
by Socrates in the discussion about rhetoric with Polus (464b-466a). It is by means of 
inflicting pain to the wrongdoer that her appetites which strive for pleasure can be 
contrasted and subsequently restrained.25 Therefore this abrupt dismissal of Glaucon 
(Ἀλλ’, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, γελοῖον ἔμοιγε φαίνεται τὸ σκέμμα γίγνεσθαι ἤδη [...], IV 
445a5-6) can be interpreted as another reminiscent allusion to the Gorgias, insofar as 
the question of the psychological function of punishment is not discussed in the 
Republic. It can be deemed as a literary device employed by Plato to lead attentive 
readers toward other dialogues in which a certain issue is more comprehensively 
discussed or approached from a different angle. Furthermore, the concerns expressed by 
Glaucon here seem to recall those ascribed by Socrates to the fictitious character of the 
helmsman in the Gorgias (511c-513c). In this passage, he seeks to persuade Callicles 
                                                 
24 Socrates makes clear that the healing power of punishment is dependent on the degree of 
injustice in the soul, insofar as there are chronic cases in which the soul can no longer be healed, 
as the following passage explains: “And if he acts unjustly – either himself or one of the people 
he cares for – he should go in person, of his own accord, to some place where he can pay for his 
crimes as quickly as possible, going before the judge as he would to a doctor, in his 
determination not to allow the disease of injustice become chronic, leaving his soul festering 
and incurable […]” (Grg. 480a6-b2; my italics). 
25 On how the alternative approach to the Socratic intellectualism advanced by Brickhouse and 
Smith deals with function of punishment through pain in the Gorgias, see 2010: 112-124. 
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that rhetoric has no more value than helmsmanship or military engineering if it consists 
only in an “art” of life-saving. Let us compare these two branches: 
(a) Grg. 512a2-b2: 
SOC: […] And so his reasoning [of the helmsman] is as follows: if someone whose body is in 
the grip of serious and incurable diseases was not drowned, then it is this person’s misfortune 
not to have died, and he has received no help from him. By the same token, if somebody has a 
host of incurable diseases in that which is of greater value than his body, namely his soul, it 
cannot be that this person should go on living, or that he will be doing him any favours if he 
saves him from the sea, or from prison, or from anywhere else. No, he knows that for a bad 
human being it is not better to go on living, since the life he leads will inevitably be a bad one. 
 
(b) R. IV 445a5-b4: 
But, Socrates, this inquiry looks ridiculous to me now that justice and injustice have been shown 
to be as we have described. Even if one has every kind of food and drink, lots of money, and 
every sort of power to rule, life is thought to be not worth living when the body’s nature is 
ruined. So even if someone can do whatever he wishes, except what will free him from vice and 
injustice and make him acquire justice and virtue, how can it be worth living when his soul – the 
very thing by which he lives – is ruined and in turmoil? 
 In both quotations the foundations of the argument are, first, the analogy 
between the healthy condition of body and the virtuous state of soul, and, second, the 
belief that life is worth living only if it is led by virtue. This similarity reinforces the 
view that this section of the Republic can be read as a reminiscent allusion to the 
discussion of punishment in the Gorgias.26 
 In sum, the four arguments advanced above suggest the conceptual affinity of 
the Gorgias with the Republic concerning issues of moral psychology, and, especially, 
concerning the epithumiai. However, to what extent can the treatment of the appetites in 
the Gorgias be compared to the theory of the tripartite soul espoused in book IV of the 
Republic? Firstly, as Charles Kahn points out, although Plato refers in the Gorgias to 
the “part of soul in which the appetites are” (τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο ἐν ᾧ ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσὶ, 
493a3; τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς οὗ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσί, 493b1) there is non-analogous attempt to 
define the rational “part” that contrasts with them.27 Nevertheless, Plato seems to 
acknowledge the distinction between the rational desire that aims at goodness – denoted 
by the verb boulesthai and its related forms – and the appetite that aims at pleasure – 
                                                 
26 Compare also R. IX 591b with Grg. 504a-b. 
27 Christopher Rowe refers to this “part” that contrasts with the appetites as “reason or the better 
parts of ourselves”, insofar as there is no clear explanation of what ought to command them 
(Plato and the Art of Philosophical Writing (Cambridge 2007), at 195). 
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denoted by the term epithumia and its related forms.28 Consequently, Kahn contends 
that the possibility of conflict between these two elements of the soul that might 
motivate it in opposite directions is not explored thoroughly by Socrates in the Gorgias, 
even though it can be reasonably inferred.  
 This reading is similar to that developed by Terence Irwin who considers that the 
idea of “self-control” intrinsic to the notion of temperance (αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχειν, 
491d8; ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἄρχοντα τῶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ, 491d11-e1) indicates the presence 
within the soul of desires of different strengths that the temperate and ordered person 
succeeds in controlling. In this view, the recognition of the epithumiai as an 
independent source of human motivation suggests the possibility of conflict within the 
soul in a different way from the kind of conflict acknowledged by so-called Socratic 
intellectualism – namely, the conflict between opinions about what is the best course of 
action, that can cause indecision but not impulsive and contrasting desires.29  The 
challenge therefore posed by Irwin, if we consider that Socrates recognizes in the 
Gorgias good-independent desires within the soul, is to understand how this can be 
reconciled with the “Socratic” position evident at 460b and 467c-ff. 
 In a similar approach, Louis-André Dorion has recently addressed the same 
question, exploring the consequences of Socrates’ idea of “self-mastery” at 491d30. He 
contends that the Platonic notion of enkrateia necessitates some partition within the 
soul, such that we find it already present in the Gorgias (2012: 33, 38). According to 
him, the reference to enkrateia at 491d must be interpreted in connection with 493a-b, 
in which Socrates talks about the “part of the soul in which the appetites are” (τῆς 
ψυχῆς τοῦτο ἐν ᾧ ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσὶ, 493a3-4). To be the master of oneself signifies control 
over the pleasures and appetites that each individual contains (ἐν ἑαυτῷ, 491e1) – 
namely in the part of the soul where the appetites reside. Dorion concludes that “the 
Gorgias parallels the Republic exactly: the reflexive usage of the expression ʽmaster of 
                                                 
28 C. Kahn, “Plato’s Theory of Desire”, The Review of Metaphysics, 41 (1987), 91-92. On the 
concept of boulēsis in the Gorgias, cf. 466b-470b. Although I agree with Kahn on the absence 
of a notion of inner conflict of the soul according to the moral psychology advanced by Socrates 
in the Gorgias, I disagree with him when he asserts that there is no trace of the thumoeides in 
the dialogue and that the epithumiai correspond not only to to epithumētikon but also to to 
thumoeides. I will attempt to show in the following topic how shame can be regarded as a 
manifestation of the thumos, such that in the Gorgias Plato presents dramatically, and to some 
extent theoretically, the third element of the soul. 
29 Irwin 1979: 190. 
30 Dorion 2012. 
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oneselfʼ (enkratēs heautou) is justified, if one understands it as the mastery one part of 
the soul exercises over another (inferior) part of the same soul” (2012: 40). He 
concedes, however, that Plato never asserts explicitly the bipartition of soul into reason 
and appetites in the Gorgias, even though he recognises the desiring part within the 
soul. Yet following Irwin’s and Kahn’s considerations, the only reasonable inference 
here is to ascribe to reason the role of controlling  pleasure and appetites (2012: 43). If 
so, the problem of the inconsistency of Socrates’ position in the Gorgias remains 
unresolved, as highlighted by Irwin.  
As mentioned briefly in the Introduction, John Cooper attempts to solve this 
apparent contradiction in Socrates’ position by showing that Socrates is in fact 
committed to the intellectualist approach to moral psychology throughout the Gorgias. 
He argues that the innovations advanced by Plato in this dialogue that point towards the 
theory of the tripartite soul in book IV of the Republic are presented not through 
Socrates’ speeches but through Callicles’. The key point in Cooper’s analysis of the 
Gorgias concerns Callicles’ psychology of intemperance that grounds his political 
views of human nature as expressed in his main speech. I quote the passage here since it 
is central to my argument: 
CAL: […] the person who is going to live in the right way should allow his own appetites to be 
as great as possible, without restraining them. And when they are as great as can be, he should 
be capable of using his bravery and intelligence in their service, and giving them full measure of 
whatever it is, on any particular occasion, his appetite is for. This is impossible for most people, 
in my view, which is why they are ashamed of themselves, and condemn people like this as a 
cloak for their own powerlessness. They even go so far as to claim that lack of restraint is 
something disgraceful, as I was saying earlier, enslaving those people who are by nature better, 
and being themselves incapable of providing for the fulfilment of their pleasures, they praise 
temperance and justice because of their own lack if manliness. (491e8-492b1) 
According to Callicles’ moral psychology, feelings like shame and fear can 
obstruct the process of fulfilling the appetites, if the person does not have sufficiently 
bravery to overcome them. Cooper remarks upon the fact that Callicles’ position 
recognizes different sources of motivation – namely, the appetites themselves, feelings 
like shame or fear, and the strength provided by bravery whose function is to overcome 
those impulses that hinder the fulfilment of the appetites (1999: 61).31 According to 
such a view, the conflict between these different forces within the soul is perfectly 
                                                 
31 Cooper considers unclear the role of intelligence (phronēsis) in this psychological process – 
specifically whether it constitutes an alternative source of motivation or serves only to provide 
information (1999: 61). 
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reasonable, and evident when, for example, an agent experiences an appetite and allows 
it to grow, but does not have sufficient bravery to fulfil it because she is strongly 
affected by shame or fear. This would be the case of a coward agent, according to 
Callicles’ moral view. 
Thus Cooper argues that the depiction of the orderly and the undisciplined lives 
in the foreign myth told by Socrates (492e-494a) is insufficient to refute every aspect of 
Callicles’ praise of the intemperate life. First, there is non-analogous element that plays 
the role assigned to bravery in the undisciplined life as considered by Callicles; the 
temperate person, conversely, has her appetites always full such that they no longer 
constitute a source of motivation, or, if do still they motivate action, this would occur 
only when agent’s wisdom judges appropriate. Second, Socrates distinguishes between 
the orderly and the undisciplined life by means of restrained or unrestrained appetites – 
that is to say, there is no idea advanced by Socrates that the temperate person must have 
some additional force within the soul that could help wisdom to overcome some unwise 
appetite whenever it arises. It seems implied that in the orderly soul this kind of unruly 
appetite cannot arise, since all appetites are restrained in advance (1999: 61). Third, 
even if the myth recognizes one “part” of the soul where the appetites reside – 
anticipating to some extent the psychological theorizing of book IV of the Republic32 – 
Plato is careful to assign the myth to a third anonymous individual. This device is 
regarded by Cooper as the means by which Plato makes Socrates realize the 
implications of Callicles’ moral psychology without confronting it directly, either to 
accept or reject it (1999: 63).33 And the implications here consist, above all, in 
understanding the impulse from the appetites as distinct motivational forces within the 
soul which contrast with reason – and, according to Callicles, which contrast with 
bravery. In any case, what matters is the assumption that underpins the subsequent 
development of the Platonic moral psychology paradigmatically espoused in the 
Republic: the recognition of different motivational sources within the soul that might 
occasionally be in conflict. For Cooper, it is Callicles who introduces these innovations, 
which Socrates chooses not to address in the depiction of the orderly and unrestrained 
lives. In sum, Cooper proposes an interpretation of the Gorgias that addresses the 
criticism made by Irwin, that Socrates’ position is inconsistent throughout the dialogue; 
                                                 
32 I will discuss this point more thoroughly in the following section. 
33 For the opposite interpretation according to which Socrates is committed to the myth he 
reports, see Dorion 2012: 40-41. 
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according to Cooper, the problematic innovations should be rather ascribed to Callicles, 
whereas Socrates’ position remains essentially intellectualist. On the other hand, Irwin 
and Cooper would broadly agree that on issues of moral psychology the Gorgias should 
be situated closer to the Republic than Kahn suggests in his book Plato and the Socratic 
Dialogue.  
Although the philosophical insights advanced by Cooper suggest a new 
approach to the Gorgias by ascribing certain innovations in moral psychology to 
Callicles rather than Socrates, his interpretation has recently been challenged by 
Gabriela Carone, as mentioned above. Carone agrees to some extent with Cooper’s 
assertion that the Socratic position is consistently intellectualist throughout the Gorgias, 
but disagrees with him regarding the so-called Calliclean moral psychology (2004: 73). 
She advances two arguments against the notion that it is through Callicles that Plato 
presents the innovations on moral psychology that will be fully developed in the 
Republic. According to Carone, there is no acute distinction between Socrates’ and 
Callicles’ positions, since “Callicles’ main disagreement with Socrates is not about the 
unity or disunity of virtues, but about a different conception of what virtue is” (2004: 
75). I will analyse the two arguments proposed by Carone and thereby demonstrate that 
they are insufficient to undermine the interpretation proposed by Cooper.  
(i) Cooper contends that according to Calliclean moral psychology (491e-492a) 
“weakness of will” (or akrasia) of the kind that Socrates refuses to recognize in other 
Platonic dialogues of the “Socratic” type – especially in the Protagoras (351b ff.) – is 
entirely possible. Cooper is referring to “the sort [of weakness] where a person has an 
occurrent strong appetite for something but refuses to gratify it, because of fear or 
shame or low spirits generally” (1999: 57). This implies the possibility – as Cooper 
emphasizes it – of inner conflict within the soul that will be central to the theory of the 
tripartite soul in book IV of the Republic. Carone, in turn, argues that this reading is 
unsupportable because “the ʻweakʼ – who would fall under Cooper’s description – are 
described as establishing the laws and abiding by self-restraint ʻwith regard to 
themselves and their own interestʼ (sumpheron, 483b6), which suggests that it would 
not be weakness of will, but rather rational, to restrain oneself, as they notice that they 
will not be able to give unlimited satisfaction to the appetites without damage to 
themselves” (2004: 73). This counterargument, however, is in fact to misconstrue 
Cooper’s position, since Carone relies on one branch of Callicles’ main speech (483b-e) 
while Cooper is actually analysing the Calliclean moral psychology outlined at 491e-
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492c. If we read Cooper’s argument with respect to the passage of the Gorgias he is in 
fact analysing, the interpretation he advances appears consistent. First, the weak people, 
since they are incapable of maximizing and fulfilling their appetites, condemn the 
superior ones because they are ashamed of their condition, such that they proclaim 
intemperance to be shameful (ἀλλὰ τοῦτ’ οἶμαι τοῖς πολλοῖς οὐ δυνατόν· ὅθεν ψέγουσιν 
τοὺς τοιούτους δι’ αἰσχύνην, ἀποκρυπτόμενοι τὴν αὑτῶν ἀδυναμίαν, καὶ αἰσχρὸν δή 
φασιν εἶναι τὴν ἀκολασίαν, 492a3-6). Therefore, to restrain oneself is not a rational 
choice made by the weak people, as Carone argues, but a necessary consequence of 
their incapacity to maximise and fulfil their appetites. It is therefore not a matter of 
choice, but of incapacity; even if the inferior chose to maximize and fulfil their 
appetites without restraint, they would be unable to do so. There is no choice involved, 
and this is why they feel ashamed of their condition. They are incapable precisely 
because they lack bravery (andreia) or intelligence (phronēsis), or both (Callicles is not 
clear on this point) to overcome feelings like shame or fear that can prevent them from 
enlarging and satisfying their appetites. I therefore believe that Cooper is correct when 
he argues that “Callicles recognizes the possibility of this sort of weakness of will” 
(1999: 57; my italics), insofar as the idea of conflict within the soul is entirely plausible 
– and even suggested – according to the moral psychology Callicles outlines.  
(ii) The second argument against Cooper advanced by Carone concerns the 
supposed disunity of virtue that can be inferred from Callicles’ statement that 
knowledge, bravery and pleasure are different things (495c-d).34 According to Cooper, 
this means that “like Protagoras, Callicles assumes that a person could have one of these 
virtues without the other. This is already clear from the way he describes the superior 
person as not only intelligent but also brave, ʻwithout slackening off from softness of 
spiritʼ [καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνωσι διὰ μαλακίαν τῆς ψυχῆς, 491b3-4]: evidently, he considers 
that some people who have the requisite intelligence are disqualified from superiority 
by being soft-hearted and unmanly – by succumbing to the inducements of mass culture 
that can lead the naturally better type of person to be ashamed to make the demands that 
his intelligence would entitled him to, if only he throw off such inhibitions (483e-
484a)”. The counterargument advanced by Carone is as follows: “Now, it is true that at 
491a-b Callicles explicates what he meant by wise (phronimos) as referring to the 
people who are ʻwise in the affairs of the state and also brave, capable of fulfilling their 
                                                 
34 Cooper 1999: 53-54; Carone 2004: 74-75. 
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conceptionsʼ; thus, Cooper has interpreted this to mean that it is courage (only) that is 
needed to fulfil thoughts that one would have independently through wisdom. But it is 
not necessary to read the text this way; rather, the evidence analysed above seems 
instead to support the reading that one needs both wisdom and bravery to be able to 
carry out one’s conception to the full”. However, Carone’s counterargument does not 
invalidate at all the reading proposed by Cooper. What Carone remarks upon here is 
precisely the condition of the virtuous person according to Callicles – that is to say, the 
agent must have both wisdom and bravery in order to fulfil the appetites whenever they 
arise (ταύταις δὲ ὡς μεγίσταις οὔσαις ἱκανὸν εἶναι ὑπηρετεῖν δι’ ἀνδρείαν καὶ φρόνησιν, 
καὶ ἀποπιμπλάναι ὧν ἂν ἀεὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία γίγνηται, 492a1-3). It therefore seems 
undeniable that in Callicles’ view intelligence (phronēsis) and bravery (andreia) are 
necessary conditions for virtue, and that intelligence alone is not sufficient condition for 
it (491b). And especially at 491b, nothing prevents from Callicles’ standpoint that a 
person who is not sufficient brave due to softness of spirit might have correct 
reasonings concerning what is best to the city he governs. In any case, what Cooper is 
considering is the case of a non-virtuous person, who is unable to satisfy their appetites 
since he lacks sufficient bravery to overcome feelings like shame or fear. If the reading 
advanced by Cooper is not necessary, as Carone suggests, it is at least reasonable, since 
it does not contradict the Platonic text. 
 I believe that the two possible scenarios for conflict within the soul which follow 
are perfectly plausible according to Callicles’ moral psychology, even though they are 
not explicitly explored by Plato in the Gorgias: (a) when an appetite arises, the person 
resolves to maximise it without restraint, but cannot identify through intelligence 
(phronēsis) the means and the right moment to fulfil it, despite having bravery enough 
to overcome feelings like shame or fear; (b) when an appetite arises, the person resolves 
to maximise it without restraint, but does not have bravery enough to overcome feelings 
like shame or fear, despite being able to identify through intelligence (phronēsis) the 
means and the right moment to fulfil it. The reason, I suggest, that Cooper has focused 
on bravery in his analysis is the central role that shame plays in Calliclean moral 
psychology – since shame and fear are traditionally associated with lack of bravery. To 
Callicles, this sentiment is the psychological sign of those inferior people who, unable 
to provide satisfaction for their own appetites, prescribe that intemperance is shameful 
(492a). Since shame is a moral feeling instilled from childhood in the soul of the 
superior people by means of laws and customs established by the inferior majority 
Journal of Ancient Philosophy 
ISSN 1981-9471 - FFLCH/USP 
www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga
J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.11, n.1. p. 20-65, 2017. 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v11i1p20-65 
43
  
(483e-484a), the virtuous Calliclean man must be able to transcend these restrictions to 
allow his natural superiority to prevail. The psychological strength provided by bravery 
is especially necessary, in Callicles’ view, to transcend these moral boundaries.  
 Carone proposes, for her part, a new approach to so-called “Socratic 
intellectualism”.  According to her, Socratic intellectualism invokes not only rational 
beliefs but also affections and emotions as decisive factors in the explanation of human 
motivation (2004: 56). Accordingly, the acknowledgement of the epithumiai as one 
“part” of the soul in the foreign myth told by Socrates – even though not fully 
developed by Plato – does not necessarily imply the rejection of Socratic 
intellectualism. On the contrary, the question is to understand how rational belief is 
related to nonrational desire and vice-versa from the intellectualist standpoint. 
According to Carone, there is no suggestion in the Gorgias that epithumia is 
independent from reason (2004: 56). Instead, Carone contends that the relationship 
between rational and nonrational is regarded as one of co-instantiation, such that 
removing the affect implies effectively removing the belief, and vice-versa (2004: 92)35. 
She attempts to resolve the supposed inconsistency of the Gorgias, as pointed out by 
Irwin, by advancing a more comprehensive understanding of Socratic intellectualism 
that includes (to some extent at least) nonrational factors in the theory of action, but that 
excludes the possibility of conflict within the soul. Yet one argument advanced by 
Carone to support the idea of co-instantiation between reason and desires seems to 
                                                 
35 In so doing, Carone rejects also the causal power of nonrational desires in producing beliefs 
regarding what is best for us to pursue (e.g. sensual desires making us believe that the 
pleasurable object before us is good, and therefore worth being pursued, such that we go 
towards this object in order to fulfil them), admitted by the alternative account of “Socratic 
intellectualism” advanced by Brickhouse and Smith (2010: 53). She relies rather on the view 
that Plato's Socrates recognizes nonrational features of the soul, but that these are directed or 
channeled by logoi (and not the other way round, as considered by Brickhouse and Smith), as 
exemplified by the case of the erōs of both Socrates and Callicles (481c-482c): the difference 
between them is not the source of the motivation (it is the same erōs, τὸ αὐτό: 481c6), but the 
object towards which that erōs is directed (2004: 70). Carone relies heavily upon the so-called 
“channel argument” from book VI of the Republic (485d6-8) that challenges to some extent the 
tripartite theory of soul developed in book IV. For the channel picture suggests that there is only 
a single current of energy in the soul (erōs, epithumiai) that can be directed towards different 
ends: in the case of the philosopher, towards learning, whereas in the case of the non 
philosopher, towards pleasurable objects concerning the body. Applying it to the case of 
Callicles' erōs in the Gorgias, according to Carone, the problem concerning his recalcitrance 
would be sorting out the appropriate logoi which could able to redirected his erōs from politics 
towards philosophy: this would ultimately explain the optimism of Socrates at 513c-d in 
persuading Callicles, provided that he submits himself continuously to Socratic scrutiny  (2004: 
90-94). 
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misconstrue the Platonic text. It concerns the role of punishment in restraining the soul 
from intemperance (503d-505c). I include the relevant passage of the Gorgias below (as 
quoted by Carone):36 
And is it not the same, excellent man, concerning the soul? As long as it is in a bad state – 
unintelligent, unrestrained [ἀκόλαστος], unjust, and impious – we must hold it back from 
[εἴργειν] its desires [τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν] and not allow it to do anything other than what will make it 
better... For this, I suppose, is better for the soul itself... And holding a person back from 
[εἴργειν] what he desires [ἐπιθυμεῖ] is restraining him [κολάζειν] ... So restraint [τὸ κολάζεσθαι] 
is better for the soul than unrestraint [ἀκολασία]. (505b, with some abbreviations) 
 Carone interprets this passage as follows: “The fact that ʻholding the soul back 
from its desiresʼ at 505b is immediately rephrased as ʻholding the person back from 
what he desiresʼ (that is, from the object of his desires) need not, as Irwin seems to 
imply, be taken to suggest that the undesirable desire persists, much as it is denied 
satisfaction. Rather, it seems more natural to take this expression as suggesting that, if 
the object of the desire is removed, the desire for that object is itself eliminated” (2004: 
77; my italics). There is nothing in the text, however, that suggests the elimination of 
the appetite when the soul is kept away from the object of desire; Socrates is instead 
referring to the restraint of the appetites as a form of punishment for the intemperate 
soul. Plato is in fact exploiting with the ambivalence of the Greek verb kolazein which 
means both “to restrain” and “to punish”; so an intemperate person (akolastos) is 
precisely one who does not restrain (kolazein) his appetites such that punishing 
(kolazein) him means restraining (kolazein) him from the intemperance (akolasia). 
Plato uses here the Greek verb eirgein to mean “holding back from”, “keeping away 
from”, and not apallattesthai meaning “to eliminate”, as employed by Socrates in his 
discussion of punishment with Polus (478a-b, d-e).37 The most straightforward reading 
of this passage, therefore, is that in order to remedy the intemperance of the soul the 
intemperate individual must restrain his uncontrolled appetites and keep away from the 
objects of these appetites – that is to say, refrain from indulging them. The restraint of 
the appetites does not imply their suppression, such that the point made by Irwin and 
                                                 
36 Carone 2004: 76-77. 
37 Even though Socrates considers the punishment meted out by the tribunals as capable of 
eliminating the evil of the soul when discussing with Polus (cf. 478 a-b, d-e), he seems more 
cautious when ascribing to the punishment provided by the elenchus the role of restraining the 
appetites – and not eliminating them – of an intemperate person such as Callicles. These two 
contexts where the value of punishment is discussed, therefore, are not perfectly compatible 
(pace Carone 2004: 77). 
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subsequently criticized by Carone is perfectly reasonable and not contradicted by the 
Platonic text – namely, that the appetites continue to exist even when restrained.38  
 That this is acknowledged by Plato is clear if we read the passage recalled by 
Carone in the context of the overall argument (503d-505c). As discussed above, 
Socrates’ argument relies on the analogy between the ill condition of the body and the 
vicious state of the soul. When addressing the case of the body (505a), Socrates says 
that the sick person is not allowed by the doctors to fulfil his appetites for food and 
drink, but he never suggests that this medical treatment entails the suppression of these 
appetites. On the contrary, it seems reasonable to suppose that the sick person continues 
to desire food and drink, although he cannot fulfil his appetites properly due to the ill 
condition of the body. This is why it is a painful state, as painful is the condition of the 
intemperate person in the foreign myth reported by Socrates (493e-494a). Therefore, if 
Carone’s intention is to use this passage of the Gorgias (505b) to support the idea that 
“one would simply drop a desire (or its associated belief) when the mind comes to learn 
that it is not good to have such a desire” (2004: 76), her attempt fails because the 
Platonic text – or at least the passage analysed by her – does not provide evidence 
enough to support it.39 In our view, the opposite interpretation which Carones argues 
against seems in fact to be the most reasonable – “ʻrestrainingʼ seems to suggest a 
picture whereby a desire (however bad and strong) exists but is opposed by an 
independent strength of the mind” (2004: 76). According to Carone, this interpretation 
represents a departure from the intellectualist approach to moral psychology, and I think 
that it is more suitable to the overall discussion about these issues in the Gorgias.40 
                                                 
38 Irwin 1979: 218. 
39 Carone seems to view this passage of the Gorgias (505b) in the context of what Socrates says 
in the Meno regarding the co-instantiation of desires and beliefs. In 77b-78b, Socrates asserts 
that we desire only what we think is good, such that the opinion determines the appetite. If, on 
the other hand, we judge that something is bad, this is sufficient to not desire it. Accepting this, 
it becomes impossible to have appetites for things we believe are bad, rendering impossible too 
the moral phenomenon of akrasia, as discussed in the Protagoras (352c-353a). But I think that 
the Gorgias – specifically at 505b – contradicts this reading since Socrates speaks of restraining 
the appetites, and not eliminating them as Carone attempts to argue. On the possible distinction 
between nonrational desires (designated by epithumein) and rational desires (designated by 
boulesthai) in this passage of the Meno (77b-78b), see Brickhouse & Smith 2010: 68-69. 
40 It is worth pointing out that Carone offers further arguments in support of her reading of the 
Gorgias, and her essay is in many respects very insightful. I lament that I cannot address all the 
arguments she advances for reasons of space. I have only examined what I consider the weaker 
aspects of her interpretation to justify my interpretation of the dialogue. 
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 Besides, if we consider that this passage of the Gorgias (503d-505c) has 
somehow a Hippocratic influence in the treatment of health and disease of the body in 
the analogy with virtue and vice of the soul, so there is an additional support for the 
idea that the Greek verb eirgen (“holding back from”, “keeping away from”) here 
means precisely to restrain from the objects of appetites, without implying, however, 
the suppression of these same appetites. In De Mulierum Affectibus treatise, for 
example, eirgein is conspicuously employed in relation to the same sort of appetites 
considered in the Gorgias – namely, those of food and drink; its author is prescribing 
which kind of food or drink must be pursued in such or such circumstances, but this 
never implies that the appetites cease to affect the person when their objects are kept 
away from her. Therefore, from the semantic point of view regarding the verb ergein in 
Hippocratic treatises, it does not entail at all the suppression of the epithumiai, as 
contended by Carone41. 
 By the same token the interpretation of the Gorgias pursued by Brickhouse and 
Smith in their book Socratic Moral Psychology seems to be problematic, if the 
physiology of the epithumai as described above is correct. As suggested by the case of 
the sick person – and by analogy, of the intemperate – her appetites continue to affect 
her even when she is kept away from the objects of desire, the reason why the medical 
treatment is painful – and by analogy, the punishment inflicted on the intemperate. So, 
even if the patient recognises that the painful treatment is beneficial to her and 
necessary to recover her healthy condition, this does not entail the suppression of these 
appetites; they constitute another source of motivation that is good-independent, as 
considered by Irwin, and might be in conflict with what we think best for us to do, even 
though Plato does not develop this idea fully in the Gorgias. Unfortunately Brickhouse 
and Smith does not discuss thoroughly this passage (505a6-b12); their main interest in it 
is to show how the role of punishment by means of inflicting pain alluded here and the 
deleterious effect of appetites and passions within the soul are entirely compatible with 
their alternative way of understanding the Socratic intellectualism, as I have summed up 
in the Introduction.  
                                                 
41 Hippocrates et Corpus Hippocraticum, De Mulierum Affectibus i-iii: food in general (11.57); 
bitter herbs/vegetables (11.68); bitter and salted food (12.23); sweet and oily food (37.39); 
bitter, salted, acid and raw herbs/vegetables (44.12); bitter food (57.10); seafood, beef, pork and 
lamb meat (121.17); drink in general (153.10); sweet and greasy food (169.25). In the treatise 
De Morbis Popularibus: garlic, beef, pork and lamb meat (6.4.4.8). 
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 The most promising comment they make on this passage from our interpretative 
standpoint is the following: “here (505b1-10), the idea seems to be that appetites 
become stronger the more they are indulged and the only way to make them weaker is 
to subject them to various forms of correction or punishment. To the extent that an 
appetite or passion is disciplined, the agent is capable of considering other factors in 
making a final judgment about whether to pursue the object of the appetite or passion – 
including factors that may weigh against pursuing the object” (2010: 80-81). Thus their 
main concern is to argue that nonrational affections have a causal role in influencing 
and shaping our beliefs concerning what is best for us to do in each circumstance, such 
that appetites and passions must be disciplined since childhood in order to avoid the 
confusion between what is really good for us and what appears only to be good (i.e. 
what is pleasant) that is ultimately the cause of our wrongdoings; otherwise, people who 
became increasingly vicious must be submitted to correction and punishment in order to 
weakening the influence of nonrational affections on moral reasonings. Brickhouse and 
Smith admit only the influence of appetites and passions on the formation of our beliefs, 
but do not concede that appetites constitute another source of motivation that is good-
independent, as suggested by the physiological explanation I have offered above42. So 
they continue to contend that for the alternative view “it remains true in every case that 
action always follows belief” (2010: 107), such that a case in which an appetite is 
strong enough so to lead one to act against what she thinks best for her to do (i.e. a case 
of akrasia) is unconceivable. And it seems unconceivable also, in turn, a case in which 
an appetite is not strong enough so to lead one to act against what she thinks best for her 
to do, but remains affecting her in the physiological level and opposing her rational 
decision (i.e. a case of enkrateia), since this would imply that appetites are to some 
extent good-independent43.  
                                                 
42 Brickhouse and Smith do not concede the good-independence of appetites and passions even 
in the Platonic moral psychology developed paradigmatically in the Republic (2010: 199-210). 
As this topic transcends the scope of this essay, I will not examine here their arguments in 
support of this view. 
43 It is worth noting that Brickhouse and Smith do not discuss Cooper's interpretation of so-
called Calliclean moral psychology because, I guess, their focus is on what Socrates says about 
moral psychology issues. They limit to acknowledge in a brief footnote Cooper' contention that 
the innovations on this field of philosophical inquiry is conveyed not by Socrates but rather by 
Callicles at 491e-492c (2010: 51). However, as I have noted at footnote 8, this is a 
methodological problem of their interpretation of the Gorgias, if we assume that Plato is the 
author of the dialogue and the different characters are the means by which he exposes its 
philosophical content. For to judge to what extant the Gorgias is related to the Republic and/or 
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 Having examined some different readings of the Gorgias, I would like to 
conclude with a consideration regarding the treatment of the epithumiai. Plato does not 
provide in the Gorgias a thorough examination of the possibility of conflict between the 
different elements of the soul as he does in book IV of the Republic, or discuss in detail 
the “weakness of will” (akrasia) envisaged by the Calliclean psychology, as he does to 
some extent in the Protagoras. Yet the philosophical content of the Platonic dialogues 
lies not only in the arguments made by the characters, but in the implications of these 
arguments; sometimes they are insufficiently explored by them and demand therefore 
further advancement. The possibility of conflict between the different motivational 
sources within the soul, as we can infer from the physiology of appetites as described 
above and the Calliclean moral psychology, presents a considerable challenge to the 
reader, and requires a more complex approach to human motivation and a new theory of 
the soul. In this sense I broadly agree with Cooper’s reading of the Gorgias, insofar as 
Plato deliberately introduces new insights concerning issues of moral psychology, 
particularly at 491e-492c, that point to a more elaborate theory of the soul and of human 
motivation, which will only be developed paradigmatically in book IV of the Republic.  
 
2. – Thumos 
 
 If the Gorgias acknowledges the epithumiai as one element of the soul in some 
extent independent from reason, what might we say about the thumoeides? Would be 
possible to suggest that even in the Gorgias Plato introduces – albeit in an incipient 
                                                                                                                                               
to the early dialogues requires us to consider the dialogue as a whole, and in so doing it seems 
likely that the former is very akin to the latter in several points differently from other early 
dialogues, especially when we consider Callicles' speculations on moral psychology issues. In 
fact, Brickhouse and Smith acknowledge that “Plato does have Socrates refer to ʻthat in the soul 
in which we have appetitesʼ at Gorgias 493a2–3 and b1, and his later characterization of 
keeping the soul in an orderly condition (see 504b4–505b12, 506d5–507a3, 507e6–508a4) may 
also suggest that he regards the soul to be composed of parts, but he nowhere in the early or 
Socratic dialogues explains what the various parts may be, nor does he in any way argue or 
attempt to explain precisely why the soul must have whatever parts it may have” (2010: 143). 
This is enough to show that even when considered from the alternative of the Socratic 
intellectualism defended by Brickhouse and Smith the Gorgias presents features that are 
peculiar once compared with other early dialogues. And I reply to them that they are right in this 
evaluation precisely because the explanation required to clarify what the Gorgias conveys in an 
incipient manner we will find especially in the Republic and other associated dialogues such as 
the Phaedrus, and not in the early dialogues. In sum, whereas they read the Gorgias looking 
backwards to the early dialogues, I contend that the more promising reading of it is looking 
towards the Republic, as I am attempting to show. 
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form – a third element of the soul? To argue for this it is necessary to show, firstly, that 
the thumoeidetic element appears in the Gorgias in the form of shame and that it plays a 
supplementary role along with reason in the dialogue, when the arguments themselves 
are insufficient to persuade the interlocutor.44 To this end I will rely mainly on the essay 
written by Jessica Moss who attempts to demonstrate that in the Gorgias, through the 
use of shame, Plato introduces the view that “without the thumos there is no systematic 
way to ensure that we overcome the desires and act in accord with reason instead.” 
Accordingly, “shame would serve as a tool for undermining the attraction of ethically 
harmful pleasures.”45 In the second part of her article, Moss attempts to show that in the 
Republic Plato develops this opposition between pleasure and shame through the 
characterization of the thumos as an ally of reason against the appetitive part of soul.46 
This is of particular relevance to my argument for the conceptual affinity between the 
Gorgias and the Republic regarding issues of moral psychology. 
 Let us start by examining some key passages from the Gorgias in which shame 
appears as a topic of discussion (for methodological reasons I will not examine all 
references to shame but only those ones concerning Callicles)47. At the beginning of his 
main speech Callicles rebukes Gorgias and Polus for not having said what they really 
thought because they were constrained by shame (αἰσχυνθῆναι, 482d2; αἰσχυνθείς, e2). 
Consequently, they were easily refuted by Socrates: Gorgias, by conceding that he 
would teach his future disciples the just things, if they did not know them previously; 
and Polus, by agreeing with Socrates that acting unjustly, even though better for the 
agent, is more shameful than being treated unjustly (482c-e). According to Callicles’ 
political view, shame is a sign of the natural inferiority of the majority who establish 
                                                 
44 In his recent essay Dorion argues for the bipartition of the soul in the Gorgias, but makes no 
reference to the role performed by shame throughout the dialogue. He assumes that the major 
innovation in moral psychology in the Gorgias is the recognition of two “parts” within the soul, 
namely, reason and desires (2012: 43 and 46-7). 
45 J. Moss, “Shame, Pleasure and Divided Soul”, in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Vol. 
XVIII Summer 2005, at 138. D. Solinas suggests that shame can be attributed to the thumoeides 
when under the control of reason (“Desideri: Fenomenologia Degenerativa e Strategie di 
Controllo”, in M. Vegetti (ed.) La Repubblica Libro VIII-IX (Bibliopolis 2005), at 479).  
46 Moss 2005: 138. 
47 We can assume for the purpose of this essay the general account of shame (aiskhunē) 
proposed by Paul Woodruff: “Shame is a painful emotion one feels at the thought of being 
exposed in weakness, foolishness, nakedness, or perhaps even wickedness, to the view of a 
community whose laughter would scald. Shame is closely related to fear of exclusion from one's 
group, since derision generally marks the exposed person as an outsider” (2000: 13). 
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laws and prescribe that having more than others is shameful and unjust. From this 
standpoint, shame assumes the role of keeping the superior people by nature obedient to 
the laws established by the majority, preventing them from achieving dominance. 
 On the other hand, Callicles asserts a new conception of justice distinct from that 
shared by the civil community, designating it the “law of nature”, “nature of the just” or 
“the just of nature” (κατὰ φύσιν τὴν τοῦ δικαίου … κατὰ νόμον γε τὸν τῆς φύσεως, 
483e1-4; τὸ τῆς φύσεως δίκαιον, 484b1). According to Callicles, justice by nature 
results in the better and superior dominating the worse and inferior and possessing more 
than them. In reality, however, the better and superior individual by nature is numbed 
and bewitched by proscriptions, spells, charms and laws opposed to nature that prevent 
his natural superiority from prevailing. In this view, shame works as a kind of political 
tool used by the inferior to control and subdue the superior. This shame consists not of 
an innate sentiment but rather of a moral feeling instilled in the soul of the individuals 
from childhood (483e-484a). Nevertheless, the superior individual by nature with 
sufficient strength of will to trample all mechanisms of moral control must be able to 
overcome them if natural justice is to prevail (484a-b).  
 The Calliclean conception of shame finds a psychological grounding when 
Socrates turns to investigating what his interlocutor means by “the better and superior 
people” (491d ff.). As mentioned above, Callicles contends that “luxury, intemperance, 
and freedom are virtue and happiness” (τρυφὴ καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ ἐλευθερία ... τοῦτ’ 
ἐστὶν ἀρετή τε καὶ εὐδαιμονία, 492c4-6). Accordingly, the person who intends to be 
happy must allow her own appetites to be as great as possible and be capable of 
satisfying them whenever they arise, possessing sufficiently bravery (andreia) and 
intelligence (phronēsis) to suppress whatever pathos might disturb the process of 
fulfilment, such as fear or shame (491e-492b). Bravery would therefore allow the 
individual to overcome these feelings instilled in the soul during childhood such that she 
might satisfy her appetites without restraint, while intelligence would allow the 
individual to select the optimal means and moment to do so. 
 But in what condition is Callicles’ soul in respect of his own morality? It is 
precisely this ad hominem aspect of the elenchus that enables Socrates to determine to 
what extent Callicles is immune to shame and, consequently, whether he is a virtuous 
person under his own moral view or is still bound to the conventions of morality 
imposed and shared by the majority. Socrates seems to conceive of shame differently 
from Callicles’ – not as a moral feeling instilled in the soul by education and customs 
Journal of Ancient Philosophy 
ISSN 1981-9471 - FFLCH/USP 
www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga
J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.11, n.1. p. 20-65, 2017. 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v11i1p20-65 
51
  
but rather as a sort of “innate moral sense” that in some way intuits goodness, as Kahn 
points out, especially concerning fundamental values of ethics.48 This would explain 
Socrates’ optimism even when faced with a recalcitrant interlocutor such as Callicles, 
whom he still believes can be persuaded, provided he submits his opinions to 
continuous scrutiny (513c-d). In Socrates’ view, Callicles’ susceptibility to shame, 
revealed by the reference to the catamites (kinaidoi) in order to refute the idea of 
categorical hedonism (494c-d), is evidence that even he recognizes that goodness and 
pleasure are different things, even if he does not recognise it clearly49. The same 
confidence in the power of shame through the elenctic process is evident in Socrates’ 
discussions with Gorgias and Polus (508b-c; 508e-509a).50 Indeed, R. McKim argues 
that in the Gorgias Socrates employs shame, and not logic, as the principal weapon to 
persuade his interlocutors that they fundamentally hold the same moral opinions he 
does, although they have not found the correct arguments to justify them.51 We must 
remind that even the Greek term elenkhos – used explicitly by Socrates in the Gorgias 
(471e-472d) to refer to the sort of cross-examination he regularly employs to investigate 
                                                 
48 Kahn 1996: 138. Woodruff argues for a similar account of Socratic shame by considering it a 
means to reach true beliefs through self-examination (as employed by Socrates through 
elenchus) (2000: 145). Tarnopolsky, in turn, distinguishes three uses of shame by Socrates: (i) 
to reveal certain universal ethical truths (such as the distinction between better and worse 
appetites by Callicles at 499b); (ii) to reveal conventional norms of Athenian polity; and (iii) to 
use these conventional norms in order to get the interlocutor's assent to premises they do not 
fully believe (2010: 40). An alternative view is held by Shaw, according to whom shame and 
fear of punishment are means by which Socrates' interlocutors (in general members of the elite) 
have internalized popular views (2015: 140). In this sense, “Plato does not consider shame a 
moral sense that conduces infallibly to truth” (2015: 124).  
49 According to Tarnopolsky's description, “the catamite was the passive partner in a male-to-
male sexual relationship who, by virtue of his passive sexuality, was denied citizenship rights 
because he was deemed incapable of taking in the role of the active citizen, future soldier, and 
defender of Athens. He was also seen as a figure of shamelessness because he failed to put up 
the kinds of restraints or boundaries necessary to participate fully as a rational and active 
citizen, and instead passively gave in his shameful and excessive sexual desires” (2010: 22). 
50 Socrates' confidence in the truth of his moral opinions is based on the fact that they have 
never been proved false by those who have attempted to refute them, as noted at 508e-509a. 
While Callicles considers that Gorgias and Polus have not expressed their real opinions because 
they have surrendered to shame, Socrates seems to regard their embarrassment as confirmation 
that, fundamentally, everyone agrees with him on such moral issues – for instance, that 
committing an injustice is worse and more shameful than suffering one – provided one submits 
his own opinions to Socratic scrutiny (508b-c). For Socrates, shame therefore seems to 
constitute a kind of intuitive recognition of the truth of his own opinions even by those 
interlocutors who ostensibly hold different opinions. 
51 R. McKim, “Shame and Truth in Plato's Gorgias”, in C. L. Griswold (ed.), Platonic Writings 
– Platonic Readings (London, 1988), at 36-37.  
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his interlocutors and their beliefs – suggests an intrinsic relationship between refutation 
and shame, since the verb elenkhein means to disgrace, put to shame (as attested in 
Homer), on the one hand, and to cross-examine, question, prove, refute, confute, and get 
the better of, on the other (cf. Liddell & Scott).  
 Jessica Moss considers that his susceptibility to shame forces Callicles to 
recognize rationally that some pleasures are shameful and, a fortiori, that goodness and 
pleasure are different things. This is clear from a careful reading on the passage in 
which Callicles is moved to shame by the example of the catamites employed by 
Socrates to refute categorical hedonism: 
SOC: Bravo, Sir! Now, continue as you have begun, don’t hold back out of embarrassment 
[ἀπαισχυνῇ]. And I mustn’t be embarrassed either [ἀπαισχυνθῆναι], by the looks of it. So tell 
me this for a start: if you feel an itch and want to scratch, and are able to scratch to your heart’s 
content, and spend your life scratching, is that living a happy life?    
CALL: That’s absurd, Socrates. You’re just scoring points. 
SOC: Yes, Callicles, that’s how I unnerved Gorgias and Polus, and made them embarrassed 
[αἰσχύνεσθαι]. But you’re a brave chap, you won’t be unnerved or get embarrassed 
[αἰσχυνθῇς]. Just keep answering. 
CALL: Very well. In that case I maintain that even the person scratching would be living 
pleasantly. 
SOC: And if pleasantly, then also happy? 
CALL: Absolutely. 
SOC: And do you mean if he just scratches his head, or – well, how much further do I have to 
go with my questions? I mean, what will your answer be, Callicles, if someone asks you, step by 
step, about all the sort of thing, what about the life of a catamite. Isn’t it horrible, shameful 
[αἰσχρός], wretched? Or will you bring yourself to say that these people are happy if they can 
get an unlimited amount of what they need? 
CALL: Aren’t you ashamed [αἰσχύνῃ] to drag the discussion down to such depths, Socrates? 
(494c4-e8; my italics) 
 I quote this long passage of the dialogue in order to demonstrate the persistent 
use of shame in the elenctic process and, more specifically, in Callicles’ case. 
Ultimately shame forces Callicles to recognize the distinction between goodness and 
pleasure, as he seems to acknowledge just after the catamite’s example (495a6-7) and 
eventually accomplishes at 499b, when he admits that in fact there are better and worse 
pleasures.52 This implies at least the rejection of categorical hedonism as formulated by 
him at 494c2-3 (καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ἁπάσας ἔχοντα καὶ δυνάμενον πληροῦντα 
                                                 
52 Moss reads this passage as follows: “Callicles responds violently: ʻAren't you ashamed to lead 
the discussion to such things, Socrates?ʼ (494e7-8). Why does he think that Socrates should be 
ashamed to refer to the pleasures of the catamite? Clearly because, as Socrates intends him to, 
he finds such things shameful: the thought of taking pleasure in something so unmanly makes 
him recoil in disgust, so much so that he thinks that even mentioning such pleasures should fill a 
man with shame. Callicles now ceases to defend hedonism with his former conviction” (2005: 
150). 
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χαίροντα εὐδαιμόνως ζῆν), even though it does not undermine a more broadly 
hedonistic conception of happiness as outlined at 491e-492c.53 From a dramatic 
standpoint, therefore, shame makes the interlocutors either recognize the truth of 
Socrates’ opinions – as Callicles does here regarding the distinction between pleasure 
and goodness – or prevent them from expressing publicly their real opinions on moral 
issues – for which Callicles rebukes Polus and Gorgias following their discussion with 
Socrates (482c-e). I will return to this point later on. 
 In sum, the main argument made by Moss with respect to the Gorgias is that 
“shame can sometimes neutralize the appetites’ destructive force where reason on its 
own has failed: it can make the agent recoil from the pleasures of the vice and aspire 
even to pains of virtue” (2005: 152). This could be reduced to the general conclusion 
that in Socrates’ view shame works as an ally of reason (at least in some circumstances). 
If so, we must verify to what extent shame can be regarded as a manifestation of the 
thumos, in order then to argue that the Gorgias presents dramatically, and to some 
extent theoretically, the thumoeidetic element of the soul as motivating actions, besides 
the acknowledgement of the epithumiai as discussed previously. In book IV of the 
Republic, for example, the peculiar feature of the thumos is anger, not shame, as 
                                                 
53 As J. Cooper points out (1999: 72-73), in the first formulation of hedonism (491e-492c), 
Callicles does not affirm categorically that the man who intends to live well must be able to 
satisfy all appetites: he says that, when the appetites arise, he must allow them to be as great as 
possible and fulfil them, having sufficient courage and intelligence to do so. This does not imply 
that the courageous and intelligent person ought to satisfy any appetite. It could reasonably be 
the case that, pondering on the nature of some appetite, he prefers not to fulfil it, considering it 
unworthy or shameful, such as the appetite for scratching employed by Socrates to refute 
categorical hedonism (494c). According to the first formulation of hedonism, it would not be 
incoherent if Callicles distinguished between the good and the bad appetites and, consequently, 
between the good and the bad pleasures. For the virtuous person would be he who is able to 
enlarge and fulfil without restraint those appetites worthy of being fulfilled, whatever they are, 
and to avoid the unworthy ones, whatever they are. In the second formulation, however, 
Callicles supports hedonism without restriction. Socrates defines it as “gratifying absolutely” 
(τὸ πάντως χαίρειν, 495b4). Accordingly, one who intends to live well must be able to fulfil all 
appetites, including those picked out by Socrates (494c-495a). By arguing that pleasure and 
goodness are the same thing, the undesired consequences chosen by Socrates are unavoidable. It 
is for this reason that Callicles accepts the conclusions reached by Socrates – in order to remain 
consistent (since he has asserted that pleasure and goodness are the same), and not because they 
reflect his real opinions on the matter (495a5-6). Facing the awful conclusions drawn from the 
elenchus, Callicles could admit – as he does at 499b – that there are better and worse pleasures. 
This acquiescence does not undermine the first formulation of hedonism (491e-492c): the 
virtuous man must allow the good appetites, whatever they are, to be as great as possible and 
satisfy them, having sufficient courage and intelligence to do so. The end of all actions would 
still be the satisfaction of the appetites and the pursuit of pleasure – but not all appetites, maybe 
just the majority of them. 
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Leontius’ anecdote makes clear (IV 439e-440a). Let us therefore examine whether it is 
reasonable to assert that shame constitutes a manifestation of the thumoeides in 
accordance with the moral psychology developed in the Republic. 
 The bridge from the Gorgias to the Republic concerning the thumos seems to be 
indicated surreptitiously by Plato through a sort of proleptic reference in the following 
passage: 
SOC: So the greatest evil will be his, maimed in soul and in a bad way as he is through his 
imitation of the despot and the power it gives him. 
CAL: I don’t know how you keep twisting the argument, Socrates – turning it upside down. 
Don’t you realise that this person who does imitate the tyrant will, if he feels like it, put the 
person who doesn’t imitate him to death, and confiscate his possessions? 
SOC: Yes, I do realise that, my worthy Callicles. I’m not deaf. I’ve heard it enough times today 
from you and Polus – and from pretty well everybody else in the city. Now it’s time for you to 
listen to me. Yes, he will put him to death, if he feels like it, but it will be someone bad putting a 
fine, upstanding individual to death. 
CAL: Isn’t that what’s so infuriating54 [τὸ ἀγανακτητόν] about it? 
SOC: Not for an intelligent person [οὐ νοῦν γε ἔχοντι], as the argument shows [...].  (511a1-b6; 
my italics)  
 In the discussion of which “art and capacity” (δύναμίν τινα καὶ τέχνην, 509e1) is 
able to prevent the agent from acting unjustly and harming himself,55 Socrates resumes 
the discussion of tyranny – begun by Polus who advances the example of Archelaus of 
Macedonia (471a-d) to support his moral opinions – and restates his opinion that acting 
unjustly is worse than being treated unjustly. When Callicles asks Socrates in the 
quotation above whether it is not infuriating (τὸ ἀγανακτητόν, 511b6) to see a fine man 
put to death unjustly by a bad one, Socrates’ reply only makes sense (οὐ νοῦν γε ἔχοντι, 
ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει, 511b6) if we consider the previous discussion with Polus. There, 
Socrates forces him to agree that acting unjustly is not only more shameful but also 
worse than being treated unjustly (474c-481b). Accordingly, for a person who possesses 
nous, whose reason is guided by right and consistent opinions, the only situation worthy 
                                                 
54 T. Griffith's translation (Cambridge, 2010) of to aganaktēton into ʻupsettingʼ lacks the ʻangerʼ 
aspect implied in the meaning of the verb aganakteō (according to L&S, in physical sense it 
means ʻto feel a violent irritationʼ, then ʻto be displeased, vexed, angryʼ). Thus ʻinfuriatingʼ 
seems to be more akin to what Plato means here. I emphasize this point precisely because this 
passage is especially important for my argument. On aganaktēo as suggesting thumos, the 
source of anger, see J. Moss, “Plato's Division of the Soul”, Oxford Studies in Ancient 
Philosophy, 34 (2008), at 43. 
55 Referring to this passage, D. Scott affirms that Socrates' reply to the question is that mere 
wish is enough to do not injustice (“Platonic Pessimism and Moral Education”, Oxford Studies 
in Ancient Philosophy, 27 (1999), at 20). Although Scott comments briefly it, that is not what 
Socrates says; he asserts clearly that to do not injustice is necessary a kind of capacity and art 
(510a3-5). 
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of infuriation would be if he himself acted unjustly, insofar as injustice is the great evil 
for the soul. On the other hand, if he is treated unjustly, there is no motive for 
indignation because the party which is harmed is the wrongdoer, and not the victim. 
Therefore, in this branch of the Gorgias Plato seems to suggest en passant an alliance – 
or at least a close association – between thumos and logos, insofar as it seems to suggest 
that infuriation is commanded by nous in such circumstances. 
 This point becomes clearer, I would suggest, if it is read as a kind of proleptic 
reference to book IV of the Republic in which Plato explains that to thumoeides is the 
natural ally of to logistikon, provided the soul has been well educated (οὕτως καὶ ἐν 
ψυχῇ τρίτον τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ θυμοειδές, ἐπίκουρον ὂν τῷ λογιστικῷ φύσει, ἐὰν μὴ ὑπὸ 
κακῆς τροφῆς διαφθαρῇ; IV 441a2-3)56. Leontius’ anecdote can be regarded as a 
complementary example to that advanced by Socrates in the Gorgias, in which a person 
possessing nous does not become infuriated when an injustice is inflicted on him by a 
wrongdoer (511a-b). In Leontius’ case, in turn, once he is dominated by the appetites to 
see the corpses (κρατούμενος ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, IV 440a2), he becomes infuriated 
precisely because he has failed to act in a rational manner and avert his eyes from the 
corpses. Socrates uses the anecdote to demonstrate that the thumos struggles against the 
sensual pleasure of the appetites (IV 440a) and concludes that it is an ally of reason by 
nature (IV 441a). Therefore, while the scenario discussed in the Gorgias represents the 
virtuous action of an agent who does not become infuriated despite an injustice having 
been inflicted on him, Leontius’ anecdote in the Republic represents an akratic action – 
outlined by κρατούμενος ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, IV 440a2 – in which the appetites prevail 
over thumos that comes to support reason57. 
 But in what sense could shame be regarded as a manifestation of thumos once its 
distinctive feature is anger, as illustrated in Leontius’ case? Let us look carefully how 
Socrates describes the episode: 
Leontius, the son of Aglaion, was going up from the Piraeus along outside of the North Wall 
when he saw some corpses lying at the executioner’s feet. He had an appetite (ἐπιθυμοῖ) to look 
at them but at the same time he was disgusted (δυσχεραίνοι) and turned away. For a time he 
struggled with himself (μάχοιτο) and covered his face (παρακαλύπτοιτο), but finally, 
overpowered by the appetite (κρατούμενος ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας), he pushes his eyes wide open 
and rushed towards the corpses, saying, “Look for yourselves, you evil wretches, take your fill 
of the beautiful sight (τοῦ καλοῦ θεάματος)!” (IV 439e6-440a4) 
                                                 
56 Consequently, within a corrupted soul the thumoeides might conflict with reason. 
57 On the discussion about whether Leontius' action consists or not in an akratic one, see 
Brickhouse and Smith (2010: 206-210) and Carone (2001). 
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 There are two strong evidences that shame is involved somehow in this action. 
(i) First, after reacting with disgust towards the sort of epithumia was affecting him 
(probably an erotic one) Leontius tries to avoid it but does not succeed.58 Embedded in 
this inner conflict he “covered his face” (παρακαλύπτοιτο, 440a1) that indicates clearly 
he is feeling ashamed before the nature of the appetite he has and doesn’t succeed in 
getting rid of. (ii) Second, when Leontius is finally overpowered by the appetite to see 
the corpses, he expresses his anger as follows: “Look for yourselves, you evil wretches, 
take your fill of the beautiful sight!” (ὦ κακοδαίμονες, ἐμπλήσθητε τοῦ καλοῦ 
θεάματος, IV 440a4). This is clearly an ironic assertion because the decaying corpses 
are in fact something shameful to see, such that the thumos induces him to rebuke 
himself against the overwhelming strength of the epithumia.59 Had he been able to 
refrain from looking and to restrain this dreadful appetite, there would have been no 
reason for him to become angry. Therefore, we can infer that the thumos is closely 
associated to the kalon/aiskhron domain, such that shame, as a natural reaction to an 
action unworthy of having being pursued, constitutes one of its manifestations.60  
 A similar situation experienced by Leontius is recalled by Plato in the Gorgias at 
the end of the dialogue between Socrates and Callicles: 
CAL: Do you think it is good thing, Socrates, for a person in the city to be in that position, and 
have no power to protect himself? 
SOC: Yes, provided he has the one thing which you has often agreed he should have –  provided 
he has already protected himself by not saying or doing anything unjust in his dealings either 
with men or with gods. This we have several times agreed to be the most powerful form of 
protection he can have. Now, if someone were to prove me wrong, and show that I do not have 
this form of protection available to protect myself or anyone else, then I would be ashamed 
(αἰσχυνοίμην ἂν) to be proved wrong, whether before a large group of people or a small group, 
or face-to-face with one person. And if I were put to death because this inability, I would be 
very infuriated (ἀγανακτοίην ἄν). (522c4-d7; my italics) 
                                                 
58 H. Lorenz, “The Analysis of the Soul in Plato's Republic”, in G. Santas (ed.), Blackwell Guide 
to Plato's Republic (Oxford, 2006), at 152. 
59 S. Büttner, “The Tripartition of the Soul in Plato's Republic”, in F. G. Herrmann (ed.), New 
Essays on Plato (Ceredigion, 2006), at 87: “Shame in turn is the fear of losing ones' honour (that 
is the respect that one deserves). If shame is focused only on one's own soul, self-disgust can 
arise, as seen with Leontius. His thumoeides – which knows very well that it is improper to look 
at corpses for the sheer sensation of it – feels ashamed before his logos that it is unable to hold 
down the epithumia which ought not be allowed to take the reins”. 
60 On shame as a manifestation of thumoeides, see Büttner 2006: 75 and 86-87; H. Lorenz 2006: 
152; M. A. Johnstone, “Changing Rulers in the Soul: Psychological Transitions in Republic 8-
9”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 41 (2011), at 157-158. 
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 This is Socrates’ final response to Callicles’ criticism of the philosophical life. 
According to Callicles, it would be shameful if the philosopher was unable to save 
himself from a dangerous situation, such as having his head unjustly cracked by 
someone who escapes from being punished for it. Eventually, the philosopher’s 
inexperience in rhetoric would lead him to fail, insofar as he is devoted to useless things 
and subtleties (486a-d). Socrates, on the other hand, attempts to rebuke Callicles by 
demonstrating that it is injustice that is the greatest evil for the soul and that it is worse 
and more shameful to act unjustly than to be treated unjustly. From the Socratic 
standpoint, it would be shameful only if it was proved he acted unjustly and was unable 
to protect himself against the real danger – namely, committing injustice. Only in this 
situation does Socrates regard it as reasonable to become infuriated, insofar as he would 
have inflicted the greatest evil on his soul. Thus, as the quotation above makes clear, the 
emotions of shame and infuriation are closely associated since they are merely different 
and correlated reactions to an action deemed unjust. 
 Furthermore, Plato’s examination of the thumoeides in the Republic is not 
confined to book IV. In book IX, when resuming the discussion of the tripartition of the 
soul (IX 580c-582a) in order to evaluate the condition of each type of individual with 
regard of happiness (βασιλικόν, τιμοκρατικόν, ὀλιγαρχικόν, δημοκρατικόν, τυραννικόν, 
580b4-5), Plato presents a wider conception of the thumoeides. This provides us with 
new arguments that help us to understand that shame is in fact one of its manifestations. 
This new approach to the tripartition of the soul introduces a new criterion for 
distinguishing between its three parts – namely, the type of pleasure and appetite proper 
to each one (τριῶν ὄντων τριτταὶ καὶ ἡδοναί μοι φαίνονται, ἑνὸς ἑκάστου μία ἰδία· 
ἐπιθυμίαι τε ὡσαύτως καὶ ἀρχαί, IX 580d6-7). The implications for the thumoeides are 
detailed below: 
─ What about the spirited part? Don’t we say that it is wholly dedicated to the pursuit of 
control, victory, and high repute? 
─ Certainly. 
─ Then wouldn’t it be appropriate for us to call it victory-loving and honour-loving? 
─ It would be most appropriate. (IX 581a9-b5) 
 Besides the angry reaction against an injustice (its reactive aspect), as evident 
from Leontius’ anecdote, the thumoeides also has its own inclinations (its active aspect) 
which differ from those of the epithumētikon (φιλοχρήματον καὶ φιλοκερδὲς, IX 581a6-
7) and those of the logistikon (φιλομαθὲς δὴ καὶ φιλόσοφον, IX 581b10). To the thumos 
Journal of Ancient Philosophy 
ISSN 1981-9471 - FFLCH/USP 
www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga
J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.11, n.1. p. 20-65, 2017. 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v11i1p20-65 
58
  
Plato assigns the desire for power, victory, honour and high reputation that in Greek 
literature typically fall within the domain of kalon, since they are objects of admiration 
and praise. Failing in reaching these goals, conversely, implies the shameful condition 
of the agent both in the eyes of others and her own.61 Indeed, as Moss points out, “Plato 
never explicitly tells us in the Republic that spirit is motivated to pursue the kalon and 
avoid the shameful”;62 however, from the evidence in books IV and IX considered 
above, it seems safe to infer that according to the Platonic moral psychology of the 
Republic shame indeed constitutes a manifestation of the thumeides. 
 If so, we can contend that in the Gorgias Plato acknowledges the domain not 
only of the epithumiai within the soul, but of the thumos in the form of shame. This 
would explain why Plato emphasizes the role of shame in the actions and discourses of 
the characters throughout the dialogue. What conclusions, therefore, may we reasonably 
infer from the presence of the thumos in the form of shame in the Gorgias? As 
mentioned earlier, Socrates and Callicles seem to conceive the function and nature of 
shame in opposite ways. If Socrates’ position is essentially intellectualist throughout the 
dialogue, as argued (albeit in different ways) by Cooper and Carone, so his conception 
of shame must be similarly intellectualist. Kahn suggests that Socrates understands it as 
a kind of “innate moral sense” through which it is possible to intuit goodness.63 
Accordingly, shame serves as a supplementary tool along with reason in forcing the 
interlocutors recognize the truth of Socrates’ moral opinions (at least some of them). To 
some extent, Socrates’ optimism concerning the possibility of convincing Callicles of 
the merit of his moral opinion, provided he submits himself and his opinions to 
continuous scrutiny (513c-d), relies on the susceptibility of all three interlocutors to 
shame. If shame constitutes this intuitive recognition of goodness, so Socrates’ task 
would simply be to correct, with the support of shame, the inconsistency of the opinions 
held by his interlocutors in order to make them understand rationally the truth of 
Socrates’ moral opinions. The intellectualist view of shame therefore does not allow for 
conflict between reason and shame, since the latter always operates in support of the 
former.  
                                                 
61 On the close connection between shame and honour, see D. Konstan, The Emotions of the 
Ancient Greeks (Toronto, 2006), at 102. 
62 Moss 2005: 155. 
63 See above footnote 48. 
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 If we consider only Socrates’ conception of shame in the Gorgias, the 
explanation above would fit also Brickhouse and Smith’s alternative view of the 
Socratic intellectualism, insofar as we can see shame actually helping to modify some 
incorrect beliefs of Socrates’ interlocutors – such as the identity between goodness and 
pleasure as supported initially by Callicles (495a). According to them, “Socrates makes 
no secret of the fact that he often seeks to create this experience [i.e. shame] in others, 
and to use shame in such a way as to lead them to change their ways. But the process, 
again, seems to work in the opposite direction from the one required by the standard 
interpretation [of the Socratic intellectualism]: instead of shame adjusting to reason, 
one’s reasoning seems to be influenced by shame” (2010: 59). And again: “the 
unpleasant experience of shame influences the way people at by inducing them to 
change their beliefs about what is best for them” (2010: 137). 
 Nonetheless, if we follow Cooper’s interpretation of the Gorgias regarding 
Callicles’ moral psychology outlined at 491e-492c, we may re-evaluate the role of 
shame according to a more complex conception of the human soul. Once shame is 
deemed to be a moral feeling instilled in the soul that prevents those superior 
individuals from having more than others and fulfilling their appetites whenever they 
arise, the attainment of virtue – that is to say, “luxury, intemperance, and freedom” – 
necessitates overcoming this kind of moral impediment. That is why bravery is one of 
the virtues praised by Callicles, which assumes the role of overthrowing whatever 
pathos might obstruct the process of enlarging and fulfilling the appetites, such as 
shame or fear. If Calliclean moral psychology admits the existence of different 
motivational forces within the soul, and, consequently, the possibility of conflict 
between them, as discussed above, so it seems reasonable that one might be not capable 
of satisfying an appetite when it arises because she is overwhelmingly affected by 
shame, even though she recognizes rationally that its fulfilment is required for a happy 
life.64 This would be exactly the condition of Callicles revealed by his susceptibility to 
shame when facing the consequences of the categorical hedonism supported by him 
(494c2-3): his embarrassment before the example of the catamites (kinaidoi) shows that 
he is still bound to the conventional morality imposed on him by the majority of worse 
                                                 
64 As pointed out by Cooper, the different strengths within the soul would be the appetites 
themselves, feelings like shame and fear, and that one provided by bravery. He considers 
undetermined the role of reason and intelligence, whether they are “the source of a further sort 
of independent force toward action or serve only to provide information” (1999: 61). 
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and inferior people, since the shameful condition ascribed to the kinaidoi is a cultural 
value shared by the Athenian society65. So, the strength of shame within Callicles’ soul 
might conflict with the strength of the appetite when it strives for satisfaction, even if he 
finds the appropriate means and the right moment to do so.  
 Therefore, if shame ultimately constitutes a manifestation of the thumos, as the 
Platonic moral psychology developed in the Republic seems to require, so it is possible 
to identify the third element of the soul in the Gorgias, albeit in a incipient form, if we 
consider seriously the implications of Callicles’ moral psychology. From the dramatic 
standpoint, we can observe how shame is represented by Plato as affecting the actions 
and discourses of the characters throughout the dialogue; from the theoretical one, we 
can find two opposing views conveyed by Socrates and Callicles: according to the 
former, shame can help his interlocutors to recognise the truth of his moral beliefs by 
changing their incorrect views; according to the latter, shame functions to some extent 
as one source of human motivation independent from appetite and/or reason in a such 
way that it might oppose to them, especially in the case of the worse and inferior 
people. 
 Having said this, however, I would like to emphasise that such conclusions are 
only possible if we interpret the issues of moral psychology presented in the Gorgias in 
view of their further development in the Republic. My intention is not to suggest that 
the Gorgias presents a neat introduction to the theory of the tripartite soul, but rather to 
explore how Plato deals with certain problems in this field of philosophical inquiry – 
especially through Callicles – in a manner that point us toward the Republic, and how 
the Republic in turn can help us to rethink what in the Gorgias is not fully explored. The 
dramatic feature of the Gorgias – the literary richness of Platonic composition – 
contributes to stimulate our eagerness in answering the questions addressed by the 
characters but not thoroughly resolved by them. 
 
3 – Conclusion 
 
 In this essay I have sought to further the debate on moral psychology in the 
Gorgias by drawing on the advances and amendments made by Plato in the Republic. 
To this end I divided my argument into two halves: the first one, concerning the 
                                                 
65 See above footnote 49. 
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epithumiai, and the second one, regarding the role of shame in the dialogue deemed as a 
likely manifestation of thumos. My ultimate intention was to argue for the treatment of 
epithumiai and the thumos as two different sources of human motivation in the Gorgias, 
the implications of which are explored more fully in the theory of the tripartite soul in 
book IV of the Republic. With regard to the epithumiai, I began by addressing the 
apparent inconsistency of Socrates’ position in the Gorgias, as he seems to recognize 
the “part of the soul where the appetites are” in the discussion of temperance and 
intemperance. As pointed out by Terence Irwin, this acknowledgement by Socrates 
would imply a new conception of the human soul in which its nonrational element 
might motivate action independently of and against reason. This new position 
apparently taken by Socrates would contradict his “intellectualist” approach to moral 
psychology expressed in the previous debate with Gorgias and Polus (460b, 467c-ff.). 
John Cooper meanwhile suggests a different interpretation of the problem identified by 
Irwin, asserting that Socrates’ commitment to the intellectualist view is consistent 
throughout the Gorgias, despite the challenge posed by the alternative moral 
psychology outlined by Callicles. According to Cooper, the innovations in moral 
psychology in the Gorgias are presented by Plato not through Socrates but through 
Callicles. Cooper contends that Callicles conceives the possibility of conflict between 
the different forces within the soul – namely the appetites, feelings like shame or fear, 
and the strength provided by bravery – and consequently the possibility of “weakness of 
will” or akrasia. This peculiar feature of the Gorgias, especially regarding Callicles’ 
moral views, points towards the moral psychology expounded in the Republic.  
 Cooper’s reading is criticized by Gabriela Carone, who asserts that there is 
nothing in the Gorgias that suggests conflict within the soul. She contends that 
Socrates’ intellectualist approach to moral psychology is entirely consistent throughout 
the dialogue, even though it somehow includes nonrational factors in its explanation of 
human motivation. According to her, affects and evaluative attitudes would necessarily 
be co-instantiated such that if one belief is removed the corresponding affect is removed 
as well, and vice-versa. This re-evaluation of Socratic intellectualism seeks to address 
the apparent inconsistencies in the Gorgias concerning the recognition of the epithumiai 
as one element of the soul, as pointed out by Irwin. In a similar vein Brickhouse and 
Smith object the supposed inconsistency of Socrates’ position in the Gorgias by 
showing that nonrational affections – appetites and passions – play a causal or 
explanatory role in Socratic intellectualism often disregarded by the standard view, 
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insofar as they might influence and shape our current beliefs about what is best for us to 
do in each circumstance, even though it is belief and the desire aroused from it that 
ultimately lead us to act. I have attempted to show, however, that the objections 
advanced by Carone are insufficient to undermine particularly Cooper’s interpretation 
of the Gorgias, and that Brickhouse and Smith’s alternative reading does not tackle in a 
sufficient manner the implications of the physiology of the epithumiai in the orderliness 
argument (505a-b), besides having disregarded the philosophical content conveyed by 
Callicles on moral psychology issues. I therefore have broadly subscribed to Cooper’s 
reading of Calliclean psychology and have sought to argue further for the conceptual 
affinity between the Gorgias and the Republic regarding the treatment of the epithumiai.  
 In the second half of this essay, I argued for the presence of the thumos in the 
Gorgias in the form of shame, to which Plato gives prominence throughout the 
dialogue. To this end I relied mainly on Jessica Moss’ reading, according to which 
shame – intrinsically associated with the thumos – acts in support of reason when the 
arguments themselves are insufficient to persuade the interlocutor. I subsequently 
contended that Plato presents the shame dramatically affecting the actions and 
discourses of the characters throughout the dialogue. I pointed out, however, that shame 
is understood in different ways by Socrates and Callicles, such that only according to 
Calliclean moral psychology is it reasonable to infer that shame – and a fortiori, thumos 
– constitutes one source of human motivation independent from reason. In so doing, I 
have sought to extend Cooper’s analysis of the epithumiai in the Gorgias to encompass 
the thumos in the form of shame. 
 In sum, I wish to conclude that the treatment of the epithumiai and the thumos in 
the Gorgias suggests the introduction of issues that will be further developed specially 
in books IV, VIII and IX of the Republic. It seems undeniable that the Gorgias provides 
a new perspective on the theory of action and human motivation that departs from the 
Socratic intellectualism we often find in the so-called “Socratic dialogues”, provided we 
assume that the philosophical content is conveyed by the dialogue as whole, and not 
only through Socrates. By means of his literary genius Plato seems to leave some issues 
raised by the characters in the Gorgias open to debate and to further development, 
rather than offering to his readers complete answers theoretically justified.  
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